Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control on the decision granting a discharge for the implemention [sic] of the budget of the European Communities for the financial year 1984. Working Documents 1986-87, Document A 2-15/86, 26 March 1986. by Scrivener, C.
European Communities DNIVERSITY OF !'ITTSBURGII lf!3R ·\RiES 
JUN ? 3 1986 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTNGS 
EN 
j 
WORKING DOCUMENTS 
English Edition 1986-87 
26 March 1986 
WG(VS1> 3408E 
Fr.-drhp 
SERIES A DOCUMENT A 2-15/86 
REPORT 
drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
on the decision granting a discharge for the implemention 
of the budget of the European Communities for the 
financial year 1984 
Rapporteur: Mrs C. SCRIVENER 
PE 103.713/fin. 
A Ser~es: Reports - 8 ser~es: Mottons for Resoluttons, Oral Questtons, Wr~tten Declarattons. etc - C Ser~es: Documents recetved from other Institutions (e.g. Consultations) 
• 
• 
• 
On 19 June 1985, pursuant to Article 78d of the ECSC Treaty, Article 205a of 
the EEC Treaty and Article 179a of the EAEC Treaty, the Commission of the 
European Communities forwarded to the European Parliament the revenue and 
expenditure accounts, the balance sheet for the financial year 1984 and the 
analysis of the financial management (COM(85) 185 to 189 final). 
The President of Parliament referred these documents to the Committee on 
Budgetary Control. 
At its meeting of 15 May 1985, the committee appointed Mrs SCRIVENER 
rapporteur. 
On 29 November 1985 the Court of Auditors of the European Communities 
forwarded to the European Parliament its annual report on the financial year 
1984 (OJ No. C 326 of 16.12.1985- Doc. C 2-147/85). 
At its meetir.gs of 18 December 1985, 22 January 1986, 4 February 1986, 
25 February 1986, and 18/19 March 1986 the Committee on Budgetary Control 
consider~c the revenue and expenditure accounts, the balance sheet for the 
financial year 1984, the analysis of the financial management, the report of 
the Court of Auditors, the following documents: Doc. B 2-895/85: motion for 
a resolution tabled by Mr Fich and others on the Commission's decision to 
grant aid to Turkey from the Third Financial Protocol in the 1984 budgetary 
year, COM(85> 213: Commission report on borrowing and lending activities in 
1984, COM(85) 447: 14th financial report on the EAGGF - Guarantee Section, 
COM(85) 492: 14th financial report on the EAGGF - Guidance Section, 
COM(85) 508: 13th report on the activities of the ESF, COM(85) 626: JRC 
execution report 1984, COM(85) 348: Annual report on the NGOs 1984, 
COM(85) 516: 10th report on the ERDF, the working documents drawn up by its 
rapporteurs on the various sectors of Community activity and the opinions of 
its specialist committees. 
At its meeting of 18/19 March 1986 the committee adopted the proposal for a 
decision and the motion for a resolution appearing in Part I by 13 votes to 4 
with 3 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr AIGNER, chairman; Mrs BOSERUP and 
Mr MARTIN, vice-chairmen, Mrs SCRIVENER, rapporteur; Mr BARDONG, 
Mr CHIOBRANDO (deputizing for Mrs Lentz-Cornette), Mr COLOM I NAVAL, 
Mr CORNELISSEN, Mrs FUILLET, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mrs HOFF, Mr PITT, Mr PRICE, 
Mr RYAN, Mr SARIDAKIS (deputizing for Mr Marek), Mr SCHHN, Mr SCHREIBER 
Sir James sce;r-HOPKINS (deputizing for Mr Escuder Croft), Mr SIMMONDS, 
Mr TOMLINSON (deputizing for Mr Sapena Granell) and Mr WETTIG. 
0 
0 0 
The opinions of the Political Affairs Committee, the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Technology, the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment, the 
Committee on Regional Policy and Regional Planning, the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation are attached to this report. The working 
documents will be published in a separate annex. 
The report was tabled on 21 March 1986. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the 
draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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A 
The Committee on Budgetary Control hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following draft decision: 
PROPOSAL FOR A DECISION 
on the discharge to be granted to the Commission in respect of the 
implementation of Sections I (Parliament), II (Council), III (Commission), 
IV (Court of Justice) and V (Court of Auditors) of the budget of the European 
Communities for the financial year 1984 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, and in particular Article 78(g) thereof, 
- having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and 
in particular Article 206(b) thereof, 
-having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community and in particular Article 180(b) thereof, 
- having regard to the budget and the supplementary and amending budget for 
the financial year 1984, 
- having regard to the revenue and expenditure account and balance sheet for 
the financial year 19841, 
- having regard to the report of the Court of Auditors concerning the 
financial year 1984 and the replies of the Institutions2, 
- having regard to the recommendation from the Council concerning the 
discharge to the given to the Commission (Doc. C 2-2/86), 
- having regard to the resolution tabled by Mr Fich and others on the 
Commission's decision to grant aid to Turkey from the Third Financial 
Protocol in the 1984 budgetary year, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the 
opinions of the Political Affairs Committee; the Committee on Energy, 
Research and Technology; the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment; 
the Committee on Regional Policy and Regional Planning and the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation and the accompanying working documents relating 
to the various sectors of Community policy (Doc. A 2-15/86 and Doc. A 
2-15/86/Ann.>, 
- whereas the budgetary authority authorized the following amounts for the 
financial year 1984 (budget and supplementary and amending budget 1/84): 
Revenue 
Appropriations for commitment 
Appropriations for payment 
1 COM(85) 185 to 189 
2 OJ No. c 326, 16.12.1985 (Doc. C 2-147/85> 
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ECU 
27 252 925 135 
30 277 996 915 
27 270 667 028 
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1. Grants a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of 
the budget for 1984 on the basis of the following figures: 
(a) Revenue and expenditure for the financial year 1984 
(b) 
1. Resources 
2. 
3. 
Revenue for the financial year 1984 
Lapsed carry-overs from 1983 
Exchange differences 
Appropriations from carry-overs from 1983 
TOTAL 
Expenditure 
Payments for the year 
Appropriations carried forward to 1985 
Earmarked revenue to be repaid 
TOTAL 
Balance (1 - 2) (DEFICIT> 
Balance sheet at 31 December 1984 
Assets 
Fixed assets 
Inventories 
Current assets 
Cash accounts 
Pre-paid expenses 
TOTAL 
Liabilities 
Fixed capital 
Current liabilities 
Accrued expenses 
TOTAL 
ECU 
26 052 434 892 
287 394 594 
25 016 688 
17 741 893 
26 382 588 067 
26 119 177 060 
1 090 095 454 
652 970 
27 209 925 484 
- 827 337 417 
11 612 581 117 
99 055 332 
2 002 866 692 
1 376 738 335 
221 348 765 
15 312 590 241 
12 043 778 676 
2 995 530 417 
273 281 148 
15 312 590 241 
2. Records its comments in the resolution which forms an integral part of 
this decision; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution 
embodying its comments to the Commission, the Council, the Court of 
Justice, the Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, and to 
arrange for them to be published in the Official Journal (L series>. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
embodying the comments which form an integral part of the decision granting a 
discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European 
Communities for the financial year 1984 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to Article 85 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977, 
which enjoins each of the Institutions of the Community to take all 
appropriate steps to act on the comments appearing in the discharge 
decisions, 
- whereas under that same article the Institutions are also required, at the 
request of the European Parliament, to report on the measures taken in the 
Light of Parliament's comments and, in particular, on the instructions given 
to those of their departments which are responsible for the implementation 
of the budget, 
- having regard to its motion for a resolution of 13 September 1985 on the 
Commission's decision to grant aid to Turkey under the Third Financial 
Protocol in the 1984 financial year (Doc. 82-895/85), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the 
other documents mentioned in the discharge decision (Doc. A 2-15/86), 
I. General comments on budgetary policy 
1. Points out that the financial year 1984 was a crucial one in that it saw 
the exhaustion of own resources; 
2. Notes that, because the 1X VAT ceiling had been reached, the Community was 
obliged, in adopting supplementary budget no. 1/84, to acknowledge the 
existence of a deficit, which it planned to cover by using up the balance 
for the financial year (266 million ECU) and by resorting to repayable 
advances from the Member States (1 003 million ECU); 
3. Notes that out of the proposed amount of repayable advances only 595 
million ECU was made over by the Member States in the course of the 
financial year, and that the deficit for the year finally stood at 
827 million ECU; stresses the danger which such solutions represent for 
the financial independence of the Community; 
4. Points out that the size of the deficit is attributable both to the 
depletion of resources and to the Lack of accuracy in the forecasting of 
revenue (overestimated) and expenditure (underestimated); 
5. Takes the view that the implementation of the 1984 budget does not 
adequately meet the objectives laid down; points out that responsibility 
for this situation is shared by the Commission <errors of management, 
cumbersome administrative procedures, inaccurate forecasts) and under-
budgeting of expenditure, the Council (interference in management, failure 
to adopt legislation and financing), the national administrations 
(unsuitable procedures) and the budgetary authority (entry of 
appropriations in the budget without any real prospect of implementation>; 
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6. Points out the Commission's specific responsibilities as regards non-
transparent management of the structural funds; warns the Commission 
against the risks of such practices and calls on it to rectify the 
situation which has arisen as soon as possible; 
7. Considers that any Community decision which will result in new expenditure 
should be accompanied by measures making specific provision for that 
expenditure to be covered; 
8. Points out that the value of any Community policy lies in its ability to 
improve efficiency and bring savings by comparison with th@ same policy 
pursued at national level; 
9. Proposes the creation of a think-tank which, acting on the basis of 
information supplied by the Commission on budgetary management and 
budgetary estimates, would seek solutions to the problems of budgetary 
imbalance; 
10. Disapproves of the Community's practice - which is at variance with the 
Treaties - of compensating for an •unacceptable situation• by means of 
refunds on revenue; takes the view that this practice, which does not take 
economic advantages into account, represents a major source of 
disintegration in the Community 
11. Points out that the accumulated total of unpaid commitments entered into 
for this and previous financial years is reaching alarming proportions and 
calls on the Council to tackle the problem of the inadequate provision of 
payment appropriations; 
12. Considers it essential for a balanced relationship to be established 
between amounts of commitment appropriations and payment appropriations; 
13. Asks the Commission to make a systematic appraisal, in the course of the 
budgetary procedure, of the real potential for implementing appropriations 
which the budgetary authority intends to enter in the budget; 
14. f.alls on the Commission to make more extensive use of its scope for 
implementing appropriations solely on the basis of budget entries, 
especially in the case of studies, pilot projects and preparatory measures 
where implementation is impeded by failure to act on the part of the 
Council; 
15. Calls on the Commission to inform Parliament, and in particular its 
Committee on Budgetary Control, systematically and immediately of any 
difficulties in the implementation of appropriations entered by way of 
amendment; 
16. Notes the failure of the procedure introduced by the Joint Declaration of 
30 June 1982 with a view to avoiding situations in which appropriations 
are not implemented as a result of lack of action on the part of the 
Council; calls on the Commission to look into the various ways of solving 
this problem and submit practical proposals; 
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17. Notes that the implementation of the structural funds has not achieved the 
desired objective, that the principle of additionality has rarely been 
applied and that the money available has not always been well spent; 
18. Proposes that structural policy objectives on the one hand and Community 
objectives on the other should be better defined and that each type of 
objective should be consolidated: 
(a) by signficantly reorganizing the management of the funds with a view 
to avoiding the current problems of delays and ineffectiveness and 
ensuring that commitments entered into are honoured; 
(b) by carrying through genuine transnational Community measures involving 
at least two Member States; 
19. Instructs the Commission to make regular assessments of all Community 
measures and to report to Parliament and the Council on the matter; 
20. Calls on the Commission to submit periodically to the budgetary authority 
information on transfers of appropriations within chapters; 
21. Draws to the attention of the Council that even though it participates in 
the discharge procedure as an institution delivering an opinion, it must 
adopt an overall view on the financing of the Communities and a detailed 
view on the comments of the Court of Auditors (in particular the 
reluctance of the Member States to investigate frauds and irregularities 
and notify them to the Commission>; 
22. Points out that this attitude on the part of the Council is due to the 
over-frequent use of the unanimous vote, which in this case greatly 
reduces the effectiveness of the decisions; 
II. COMMENTS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPECIFIC SECTORS 
Own resources 
23. Draws attention to the support it gave in its motion for a resolution of 
15 November 1985 to the Commission's preference for the returns method 
with regard to the calculation of resources; 
24. Calls on the Commission to press ahead with the work carried out by its 
statistical office, which compares estimates of the VAT base calculated 
from national accounts with the VAT base declared by the Member States in 
their annual returns- without calling into question the nature of such 
revenue as own resources; 
EAGGF Guarantee Section 
25. Supports the Commission's efforts to speed up the procedures for clearing 
the accounts in Line with its comments accompanying the decision granting 
a discharge for 1983; calls on the Commission to ensure that the delays 
are not eliminated at the expense of effective controls; calls on the 
Commission to propose a system for the payment of EAGGF Guarantee Section 
expenditure which obliges the national authorities responsible for 
payments to declare f~audsand irregularities; 
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26. Takes the view that the existence of large stocks of various agricultural 
products highlights the deficiencies of the common agricultural policy; 
considers it essential that a programme for releasing the main products 
from storage should be submitted within the next six months; 
27. Notes that public storage in the beef and veal sector is reaching alarming 
proportions, a phenomenon aggravated by the imbalances in the geographical 
distribution of intervention stocks; 
28. Requests the Commission and the Member States to cut back as much as 
possible on the withdrawal of fruit from the market by encouraging sales 
to processing industries; 
29. Considers that the Commission did not react quickly enough to the 
accumulation of large stocks of butter, thereby being placed in a position 
where it had to dispose of these stocks at any price; calls upon it to 
introduce a strategy for marketing and donating such stocks; 
30. Asks the Commission to apply the Community rules on dairy quotas; 
EAGGF - Guidance Section 
31. Requests the Commission to define clearly the aims of its measures under 
the EAGGF Guidance Section; calls on it to avoid measures involving 
contradictory effects within the EAGGF Guidance Section or between EAGGF 
guidance operations and EAGGF guarantee operations; 
Regional Fund 
32. Deplores the fact that the Member States have not submitted specific 
Community projects and regrets that it proved impossible in 1984 to commit 
the 10 million ECU allocated to the non-quota section and entered by 
Parliament in the budget; 
Social field 
33. Regrets the fact that in 1984 it proved impossible to make full use of the 
appropriations allocated by Parliament to that part of the budget cov~ring 
the social sector, with the result that cancellations occurred despite the 
reforms made to the Social Fund; 
~2nagement of research and development programmes 
34. Calls on the Commission to streamline its administrative procedures for 
the recruitment of officials and the payment of contract staff; 
Commission staff, administrative expenditure and premises 
35. Calls on the Commission to ensure that major contracts are awarded solely 
after invitation to tender save in rare cases of exceptional urgency; 
Development aid 
36. Draws attention to the continuing very low rate of utilization of 
appropriations for cooperation with Asian and Latin American developing 
countries (Chapter 93) and with the ACP countries under the special 
programme to combat hunger in the world (Article 958>; 
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37. Notes the Commission's inability to achieve a satisfactory rate of 
lJt1l f1ation of payment appropriations intended for development aid schemes 
carried out by NGOs; takes note of the Commission's explanations for this 
phenomenon (cuts necessitated by the inadequacy of resources, Level of 
appropriations beyond the absorption capacity of the Commission's 
departments>; 
38. Calls on the budgetary authority to take this situation into account; 
39. Calls on the Commission to improve the efficiency of its departments, and 
to speed up the procedures for processing project files and paying 
beneficiaries, particularly where modest sums are involved; 
40. Takes the view that the decision-making procedures for food aid and the 
EDF are not consistent with standard budgetary practice; calls attention 
to Parliament's proposals for putting an end to this situation; 
41. Notes an improvement in the implementation of food aid, but regrets the 
fact that, given the cumbersome nature of the procedures involved and in 
particular the need for multiple consultations of the national 
administrations, it is virtually impossible to reduce implementation times; 
42. Supports the Commission's efforts to integrate food aid into food 
self-sufficiency policies which take account of Local conditions; feels 
obliged to point out that these efforts have so far only been applied in a 
limited number of countries; 
43. Asks the Commission to take an early and unequivocal decision on the 
Community's assuming responsibility for the transport of aid; 
44. Invites the Commission to make further improvements in the supervision of 
'counterpart funds' deriving from the sale of food aid products; 
45. Welcomes the stepping-up of checks on the quality of aid; will Look into 
the problems posed by such checks and in particular by the use of private 
firms to carry them out; 
The case of Turkey 
46. Disapproves of the Commission's decision to make payments under the Third 
Financial Protocol with Turkey going beyond the Level of appropriations 
entered by the budgetary authority for this purpose; points out that the 
Council's ambiguous attitude and its failure to take a political decision 
only served to aggravate the Commission's problem; stresses that the 
Commission's difficulties in this matter were due to inaccurate forcasting; 
The Community's borrowing and Lending activities 
47. Calls once again on the Commission to ensure that the European Investment 
Bank's commission for NCI, EURATOM and development aid operations does not 
exceed its administrative costs. 
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Fraud and irregularities 
48. Calls on the Council to adopt as soon as possible the proposals for 
regulations strengthening the power to investigate irregularities and 
institute proceedings, particularly in the revenue sector; 
49. Calls on the Commission to coordinate the various checks carried out by 
its departments on the basis of existing regulations and to extend such 
checks and investigations in the Member Stat~s in cooperation with the 
national administrations. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
PART I 
The financial year 1984 marked a turning point in the budget cr1s1s which had 
beset the Community since 1982. To be complete, the discharge procedure for 
1984 must include a general appraisal of the budgetary situation in the 
Community. It would be desirable at the outset to indicate where the political 
responsibility for this situation lies. 
A. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
There is a strong temptation to place the entire burden of responsibility on 
the Commission. In a traditional parliamentary system the responsibilities of 
the executive are clear. At first sight, Article 205 of the Treaty of Rome 
also places the responsibility for the implementation of the budget fairly and 
squarely on the Commission. In fact, however, the situation is more complex 
and the powers and responsibilities of the various institutions often overlap. 
1. The responsibilities of the Commission 
It is for Parliament, acting on a recommendation from the Council, to grant or 
refuse a discharge to the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission is 
required to implement the budget on its own responsibility. However, the 
degree of responsibility varies depending on the problems involved -
inadequate rate of utilization, failure to achieve a political objective, 
inadequacy of resources, failure to contain agricultural expenditure, or the 
accumulation of commitments which have not yet been met. 
(a) There are a number of reasons which could account for the failure to 
implement appropriations in accordance with the objectives set by the 
budgetary authority. 
- The Commission might have compromised or delayed the implementation of a 
measure as a result of mismanagement. Cumbersome administrative 
procedures might have impeded the implementation of a programme or the 
recruitment of staff. In such cases, the Commission must bear the 
entire responsibiility. In this connection, for example, the Court of 
Auditors takes the view that in the case of the milk marketing boards 
(point 4.37(d)), the time taken for the Commission to react helped to 
prolong a situation which ran counter to the spirit of the rules 
involved. Similarly, the implementation of a number of research and 
development programmes was delayed as a result of the slow recruitment 
procedures for officials and contract staff. 
- On the other hand, responsibility should at least be shared if the 
delays in the implementation of appropriations are attributable to the 
Council's failure to take legislative action or to administrative 
holdups in the Member States. In such cases, we are at the very most 
entitled to ex ect the Commission to ado t a firm attitude and to use 
the legal avenues open to 1t un er t e treat1es. 
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(b) Excessive discrepancies between estimated and actual requirements may be 
attributable to unrealistic forecasting; the authorities concerned may, 
for instance, have overestimated the Community's political ability to 
implement a given measure, or the Commission may have failed to assess 
certain factors correctly, as is often the case with EAGGF expenditure 
arising from measures involving factors such as the size of harvests, 
which in turn depend on the weather, price trends on the world market, the 
value of the dollar etc. It is true that a great deal of uncertainty 
attends data of this kind, but it is also true that the Commision does not 
have the best forecasting and management instruments. For example, more 
reliable information on harvest prospects and hence on world market trends 
is available more quickly in the United States than it is here. Moreover, 
the Commission is required to manage the agricultural markets through the 
intermediary of national bodies over which it does not always have 
adequate control. 
(c) The evaluation of policies 
The Commission makes a systematic assessment of the results of financing 
measures under certain sections of the budget. This applies, for example, 
to development aid, research and industrial policy. Reports are then 
prepared and forwarded to the budgetary authority or the discharge 
authority. These reports are, of course, extremely useful to the 
Commission, which can, if necessary, improve its management techniques and 
also to the Council and Parliament, which can make a better assessment of 
the impact of the policies they decide upon. 
However, the assessments made of sectors of more financial significance, 
such as the agricultural policy or the structural funds, are in no way 
complete. A full assessment would admittedly be difficult in such cases as 
a result of the complexity and vagueness of the aims pursued. Indeed, it is 
doubtful whether the Commission has the necessary means to carry out full 
assessments, but it is nevertheless vital that they should be carried out. 
2. The responsibilities of the Council 
The Council is responsible for all the legislation specifying how and for what 
purpose the appropriations entered in the budget are to be used. It may thus 
be responsible for the incorrect utilization of appropriations if the 
legislation in question is defective and does not, for example, provide for 
adequate or effective control procedures or clearly specify the economic 
objectives to be achieved. In the light of the recommendations made by its 
financial controller, the Commission systematically examines from this point 
of view the proposals it prepares for the Council. 
It may also happen that an appropriation is entered in the budget for 'any 
significant new Community measure' before the necessary legislation has been 
adopted. For cases of this type, the agreement of 30 June 1982 between 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on various measures to improve the 
budgetary procedure states that 'the Council and the Parliament undertake to 
use their best endeavours to adopt the regulation concerned by the end of May 
at the latest. If by this time the regulation has not been adopted, the 
Commission shall present alternative proposals (transfers>, for the use during 
the financial year of the appropriations in question'. 
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What steps can be taken to ensure that the utilization of appropriations duly 
entered in the budget is not prevented by the Council's inability to adopt a 
regulation? In theory, the solution would appear to be simple. All that is 
necessary is that the budgetary authority should enter only those 
appropriations which the Commission is sure can be used. In practice, of 
course, the situation is more complicated. The institutions have to agree on 
the list of measures which can be implemented without regulations. Then, 
where appropriations cannot be implemented without a regulation, an 
alternative solution must be found in case the legislation concerned cannot be 
adopted in time. This is something which should form part of the budgetary 
procedure and involve talks between the budgetary authority and the Commission. 
3. The responsibilities of the budgetary authority 
The Commission prepares its preliminary draft budget mainly on the basis of 
technical considerations, although policy options are of course defined in 
advance. The budgetary authority, on the other hand, often enters 
appropriations in the budget as a means towards political decisions. In the 
process it relegates the need to rationalize budget expenditure to second 
place. As a result, appropriations are sometimes entered when there is no real 
possibility that they will be utilized. This may give expression to a 
political aim but does not take account of the effects on the budgetary 
situation. 
Similarly, the budgetary authority artificially inflated the volum~ of payment 
appropriations for the Social Fund, which gave rise to cancellation~. 
B. THE BUDGETARY SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY 
The Community decided to opt for financial independence in 1970 but it was 
more than ten years before the necessary machinery for own resources and in 
particular for revenue from VAT became operational. 
Even then, the Community only really enjoyed three years of financial 
independence. In 1982 it was plunged into a serious budget crisis. It is 
against this background that we must assess the budgetary situation in the 
Community and its effects on the financial year 1984. 
0 
0 0 
1. The depletion of own resources and the tendency to revert to national 
financing 
The concept of the Community's own resources, which stems from the Council's 
decision of 21 April 1970, is closely connected with the notion of financial 
independence. There can be no such independence unless agreed policies can be 
financed exclusively from own resources decided upon at Community Level. 
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It was not until 1980 that resources from VAT were entered in the revenue 
section of the Community's budget; even so the introduction of this new source 
of revenue does not guarantee effective financial independence for the 
Community. The facts of the situation cannot be properly appreciated unless 
it is realized that there is a weakeness in the system of own resources, 
namely the machinery designed to ensure that a balance is maintained between 
budgetary revenue and expenditure. 
On the one hand, the exhaustion of own resources placed the implementation of 
Community policies in jeopardy, but on the other, the Member States, reluctant 
to accept an excessive increase in Community expenditure - which was already 
rising rapidly - not only refused to agree to financial machinery in the form 
of new own resources to obviate the imbalance but embarked on a course 
designed to bring the Community's budgetary system gradually back into the 
national framework. 
Clear evidence can be found for this tendency in the machinery for covering 
expenditure entered in recent years in supplementary budgets. The 
introduction of •reimbursable advances• granted by the Member States, which 
became official with the entry of a new special line in the budget (Article 
820 of the revenue section) runs counter to the specific provisions of 
Articles 5 and 199 of the EEC Treaty, which require the Member States to cover 
the Community's expenditure. The formula chosen (advances) may not refer 
to'contributions• but that cannot hide the fact that if the situation were to 
persist subsidies of this kind would in time take on the guise of long-term 
loans which bear a strong resemblance to non-repayable contributions. 
The immediate consequence of this is that the system of own resources, while 
strictly still in force, is gradually being robbed of all meaning and 
budgetary equilibrium is once again increasingly becoming a matter for the 
Member States. The Community's financial independence is now nothing more 
than a facade. This is not something that suddenly became apparent in 1984. 
It had been foreseen by Parliament at the beginning of the eighties and by 
1982 it became impossible to ignore it. 
I~ it possible to stop this trend? 
Relations between the institutions in the preparation and implementation 
of the budget could be improved. However, it would first be necessary to 
generate a climate of mutual confidence to replace the atmosphere of 
mistrust which has poisoned relations between the institutions in recent 
years. 
Relations between the Communit and the Member States: these should ensure 
a clearer breakdown of res~ons1bi t es based on more effective criteria 
and a precise definition o what constitutes a Community policy. Indeed, 
such a definition is essential to deciding which expenditure and 
responsibilities must be borne by the Community and which by the Member 
States. 
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The Commission, which is responsible for preparing the preliminary araft 
budget, and the Council, which has sole responsibility for c:ompu!.sory 
expenditure, could try to submit more accurate estimates. The n~ed for 
improvements in the forecasting of revenue and expenditure was stressed by 
the Court of Auditors, in particular in point 1.20 of its General Report, 
which points out that in 1984 revenue from agricultural levies was 
overestimated by about 700 million ECU. Moreover, in the financial. ye.ar 
1985 the impossibility of achieving a balance between expenditure, and own 
resources, which were too low, led to inadequate estimates of expenditure 
which obliged Parliament to reject the budget at the first stage of the 
budget procedure. 
2. Relationship between revenue and expenditure 
As a branch of the budgetary authority, the European Parliament also has 
specific powers. It enters commitment a'r(robriations in the budget, but ther·~ 
must be a real possibility that these w l e implemented. In order to ensure 
that this is the case the Commission should indicate in the course of the-----
budgetary procedure whether such implementation is possible or not. 
Parliament should shoulder its responsibilities. 
When the gap between commitment appropriations and payment appropriations is 
excessively wide, the commitment appropriations cease to represent a 
progressive element in the budget and become an insurmountable obstacle two or 
three years after they were entered. All commitment appropriations are 
destined to add to the cost of the past if there are no payment appropriations 
to cover them. By refusing to settle unavoidable commitments and approving 
commitment appropriations which did not have to be covered immediately by 
revenue the budgetary authority has created a backlog of commitments which 
have to be met. This situation is highly dangerous. 
The facts 
financial 
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3. The problem of the transfer of resources throu h the structurat funds and 
the ot er 1nstruments o t e u get 
(a) The structural funds 
One of the main objectives underlying the creation of the European Economic 
Community is specified in the preamble to the Treaty, which refers to the 
strengthening of the unity of the economies of the Member States and the 
harmonious development of these economies. In practice, the Community has 
tried to give effect to this principle by arranging transfers of financial 
resources from the richest regions or Member States to the poorest regions or 
Member States. These transfers have in the main been carried out through the 
intermediary of the structural funds (Social Fund, Regional Fund, EAGGF 
Guidance Section>, which are designed to finance Community policies. Over the 
years many of these Community policies have been robbed of their substance and 
refashioned on the basis of the policies of each of the Member States. 
In principle the role of the Community's structural funds is not to provide 
budgetary financing in the traditional sense within the framework of a 
short-term economic policy but to create economic structures conducive to 
development. The structural objectives of these funds may be summed up as 
follows: 
the main aim of the European Social Fund is to finance aid for 
professional training; the 'less-favoured economic region' criterion is 
maintained, making the Fund an instrument of regional integrationa 
The EAGGF Guidance Section is devoted to measures to improve agricultural 
structures in the production and marketing sector; it also applies 'the 
less-favoured region' criterion. 
The European Regional Development Fund is the specific instrument of the 
policy for ec~1omic convergence. 
The three Funds are managed by the Commission, which coordinates their 
activities, concentrating on measures to consolidate integration. However, we 
must ask ourselves whether these Community policies have been effective. In 
fact, in the report it drew up at the request of the Stuttgart Summit, the 
Court of Auditors expressed doubts on the matter and pointed out that the 
funds would not fulfil their proper purpose if Community financing replaced 
national financing instead of supplementing it. 
As the Court of Auditors observed1, recipient Member States do not provide 
the information necessary to ensure that Community aid is additional in nature 
and is not simply used as a substitute for national funding. In point of 
fact, they are not required to supply information on trends in national 
financing. However, the accounts submitted by the Commission show that the 
rate of utilization of payment appropriations for Community measures in 
support of national economic policies (Regional Fund, Chapter 50 and general 
measures under the Social Fund, Chapter 60) is very close to 100%. On the 
other hand, the figure is lower than 50% for specific Community measures ir, 
1stuttgart report 
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the regional (Chapter 50) and social (Chapter 61) sectors, which call for more 
direct coordination and assessment. This clearly suggests that the funds 
serve much more to provide back-up financing for national policies. 
In the light of these shortcomings it might perhaps be justifiable to make 
improvements by: 
several llllember 
(b) The 'net contributor' concept 
This issue first arose during the negotiations on the United Kingdom's 
accession to the European Community. Evolving through the notion of an 
'unacceptable situation' for one llllember State, the concept of net contributor 
to the Community budget became the yardstick for identifying an 'unacceptable 
situation• which had to be eliminated by financial measures. 
A financial instrument in favour of countries which were net contributors 
operated, under certain conditions, between 1976 and 1982, but the European 
Council held on 25/26 June 1984 in Fontainebleau affirmed that any llllember 
State whose budgetary burden was excessive could obtain a reduction in its 
share of VAT. 
The ill effects of this issue on the development of the Community's financial 
life are obvious. The notion that each Member State should automatically be 
able to offset what 1t puts into the Community budget with what it takes out 
inevitably means that the economic advantages of European integration are not 
taken into account. Such advanta es cannot be measured on the basis of the 
financial contributions of the Mem er States. Account must a so e ta en of 
the multi l in effect of the revenue from international trade and of all the 
positive effects o specialized on, etc. 
L}. fhe cost of the past 
~ 'co~. o: th~ past' represents the sum total of commitments which were 
entered into in the current financial year and in previous financial years and 
which must be honoured in future financial years. It is a problem which had 
already become serious enough to warrant criticism in the resolution 
accompanying the discharge decision for 1983 and which is now becoming more 
and more alarming. At the closure of the financial year 1983 the total figure 
for unpaid commitments stood at 8 900 million ECU; the amount not covered by 
c?.rryovers of payment appropriations ran to 7 800 million ECU. The 1984 
accounts reveal an overall commitment burden of 10 346 million ECU (+ 16%); 
the amount not covered by corresponding payment appropriations totals 
9 600 mill ion ECU (+ 23%). 
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This phenomenon is due to the inadequate prov1s1on of payment appropriations; 
indeed, underbudgeting was exceptional in 1984, when the final level of 
payment appropriations for the guidance sector, the regional sector, the 
social sector and the cooperation sector showed an overall reduction of 12%. 
The fact that the problem affects specific sectors makes it even more 
alarming. 80% of the commitments in respect of which payment was deferred to 
future years and which ~ere not covered by carryovers of payment 
appropriations relate to three budget lines concerning the Regional Fund 
<Article 500>, the Social Fund (Chapters 60/61) and cooperation with the 
non-associated developing countries (Article 930). Commitments entered against 
these lines and still to be paid showed a 25% increase over the 1983 figures. 
Two comments are called for: 
the 'cost of the past' is a problem which relates mainly to policies 
involving non-compulsory expenditure, which are of paramount concern to 
Parliament; 
in 1984 the problem of unpaid commitments for these policies assumed 
unacceptable proportions; a solution must be found. 
The remedy lies with the two branches of the budgetary authority: Parliament 
must accurately monitor the feasibility of implementing commitment 
appropriations to be entered against lines involving non-compulsory 
expenditure on the basis of an analysis of the costs and additionality of aid 
from the structural funds as requested by the Court of Auditors on several 
occasions (Stuttgart report and annual report for 1984>. However, the main 
responsibility lies with the Council, which must come to terms with the 
problem of underbudgeting. The Council acknowledged the need to do this 
during the 1986 budgetary procedure but stressed that the issue was a complex 
one which had to be resolved in cooperation with the other branch of the 
budgetary authority. 
PART II PARTICULAR COMMENTS ON THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984 
A. GENERAL DATA 
1. Implementation of appropriations 
The European Parliament has frequently emphasized the need to implement 
appropriations as fully as possible and to resolve the serious problem of 
resources left unused because estimates did not match expenditure. It may be 
recalled that the resolution attached to the decision on the discharge for the 
financial year 1983 makes reference to the rate of implementation considered 
to be essential. A budget line is considered to be under-used below a 
threshold of 90%, for payment and commitment appropriations. 
We shall merely consider the operating appropriations of the general budget 
(Section III - Commission- Part 8): 
the non-differentiated appropriations for the year show a satisfactory 
level of implementation (98% for payments and virtually 1oo£ for 
comm1tment appropriatlons). 
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A more detailed examination shows that the main difficulties occur in the 
following areas: 
-fisheries policy (Title 4: commitment appropriations 54.3%- payment 
appropriations 42.8%) 
- operations in the field of research and industrial policy etc. (Title 7: 
commitment appropriations 68.8% - payment appropriations 66%) 
- and in the cooperation sector (Title 9: commitment appropriations 76.5% -
payment appropriations 56.4%) 
An analysis of the causes of these delays in the implementation of 
appropriations may be made to determine to what extent they disclose either 
difficulties in programme management or result from over-estimated entries of 
appropriations. 
The principal causes of the delays can be summarized as follows: 
- delays in the adoption of a legal basis (Lines 4110, 4111, 4112, 416, 6610, 
~1, 6612, 7302, 7306, 7320, 7331, 7503, 7771); 
- delay in or lack of a programme decision by the Council (Line 781>; 
- delay in or lack of an opinion by the advisory committee (Lines 7020-7022; 
7031-7035; 7521); 
or a lication for reimbursement 
- slowness of certain durin the start-u 
phase of 
With the exception of the latter case of delays attributable to difficulties 
in the start-up of new policies, it can be said that the main reason for 
delays stems from factors outside the control of the management: slowness of 
the Council in drawing up a legal basis or approving operational programmes, 
difficulties encountered within the various bodies involved throughout the 
decision-making procedure (advisory committees, national governments>. 
Another factor which may affect the initial implementation of the budget lies 
in the transfers of appropriations fro. one chapter to another, apart from the 
transfers from Chapter 100 which do not represent a change from the initial 
estimate. The volume of such transfers has virtually doubled compared with 
the financial year 1983 and amounted to 6% of the budget (the figures for 
commitment appropriations are 1 738 m ECU and for payment appropriations 
1 691 m ECU). 
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This phenomenon assumes even greater proportions if one looks at the volume of 
transfers within chapters that the Commission can carry out without 
n•Jthorfzation from Parliament or the Council on the basis of Article 21<3) of 
the Financial Regulation. Such transfers, on which the Commission is not 
required to supply details, can however be quantified on the basis of 
information contained in the management accounts. They amount to some 1 500 m 
ECU and represent about 5% of the implemented budget. The overall effect on 
the budget of these two kinds of transfer exceeds 10% and reveals a 
considerable imbalance between the estimates and the actual amounts used. The 
Commission, which is responsible for drawing up estimates and implementing the 
budget, must paY more attention to this problem, in order to provide the 
budgetary authority with more com lete and s stematic information. In 
particular, the Commission could prov1de t e budgetary authority w1t periodic 
information on the transfers within chapters. 
As regards the implementation of payment appropriations carried over from the 
financial year 1983, the management account shows that 22% of differentiated 
appropriations and 6% of non-differentiated appropriations were cancelled. 
Such cancellations a~ount to 281 m ECU, comprised of 35 m for 
non-differentiated appropriations and 246 m for differentiated 
appropriations. They relate mainly to Title 3 - EAGGF - Guidance Section, 
Title 5 - Regional Fund, Title 6 - Social Fund, Title 7 - Research, etc. and 
Title 9 - Cooperation and development. 
The reasons for such cancellations vary, viz. 
-accumulated delays in the implementation of the budget line concerned, 
- the need to make savings during the implementation of the budget. 
A characteristic example in this respect is the cancellation of some 30m ECU 
on two budget lines (24.5 m under Article 930 and 6 m under Article 941) thus 
blocking the use of the appropriations to make savings. 
2. Use of appropriations entered in the budget following amendments by the 
European Parliament 
In the general comments it has already been pointed out how the implementation 
of the budget involves particular responsibilities for the Commission (primary 
responsibility under the terms of Article 205 of the EEC Treaty) and the 
Council, which has to provide the budget lines with the necessary legislative 
backing. 
These ,~espons ibil ities assume additional importance when the appropriations 
are entered in the budget following amendments by the European Parliament: in 
this case the budgetary procedure ceases to be a simple matter of recording 
the financial consequences of extrinsic legislative acts and becomes part of 
the formulation of new Community policies. 
The actual implementation of the political will expressed by the European 
Parliament in its budget amendments, however, requires the cooperation of the 
other institutions which exercise budgetary powers: in this way the role of 
the Council and the Commission is defined in the implementation of the legal 
basis of the new budget lines (or the adoption of action programmes) and the 
use of appropriations respectively. 
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The exercise of this role was unfortunately curbed during the financial year 
1984, when many factors helped to hinder the implementation of Parliament's 
amendments, thus depriving the budget of part of its political content. 
For example: of the appropriations entered in the budget following an 
amendment, only 19.7% of the commitment appropriations (differentiated) were 
used, while 39% of the (differentiated) payment appropriations and 
non-differentiated appropriations were used (see wor!dng document PE 100.261). 
The reasons for this low level of implementation of the amendments are varied: 
- delays due to the lack of a legal basis, for example, lines 388, 646, 66·l0 8 
6611, 6612, 7027, 7302, 7306, 7320, 7331 and 781, for which the Council did 
not adopt the basic regulation <or decision) until the second half of the 
financial year or even during the course of the following financial y~ar; 
in such cases, in view of the inertia on the part of the Council, whic~ 
provided no Legal basis for these budget lin!_sf t~~mission_!!£utd have 'tl2_ 
react by implementing directly the lines re[at n~ to p1rot project st~J~~ 
or preparatory actions (such as, action to protect forests against fires an-:1 
acid rain and the action to combat poverty); 
-delays in the conclusion (or lack of) ereliminar~ a~reements with the M~rnber 
States or with public or private organ1z~]Ons ~ t e Member States or th~rc 
countries. Such delays are often caused by lack of cooperation by the 
national organizations (example: Article 510: specific Community action), 
but may confirm the suspicion that the entry of appropriations by the 
budgetary authority does not meet the specific needs of those for whom the 
proposed action is intended; in such cases it is the responsibility of the 
budgetar~ authority, and in particular Parliament, which is the originator 
of addit1onal appropriations, to make a considered assessment of the 
prospects for the use of such appropr1at1ons. 
- transfers carried out on 
payment appropriat1ons 1 erent ate an 
appropriations introduced by way of amendment of 
transfers and have been diverted from the aim originally envisaged by 
Parliament. In many cases the transfer has been made within one and the 
same chapter and, consequently, without requiring the intervention of the 
budgetary authority; in such cases the Commission should undertake to 
inform Parliament in due course of all the facts needed to enable the-use of 
arliamentary a propriations existfn after the transfer o eration to be 
mon1tore o 
The situation described above in fact presents a serious problem: that of 
avoiding a reduction in the political role devolving on Parliament in the 
budgetary procedure by increasing its decision-making power in accordance w'ith 
the Treaties of 1970 and 1975a 
Given that this reduction is not being brought about by formal means btJt by a 
~~~--~and unobtrusive approach involving the procedurP.s for the 
implementation of the Community budget, only the exercise of parliamentary 
c~.trol over the im Lementation of the budget can really safeguard 
Pari. tament s powers ect an n 1 rect t e o 1t1 ca. value of the 
bUdget 1tse 
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B. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS 
1. The ESPRIT programme 
The utilization of appropriations for the ESPRIT programme has attracted th~ 
attention of control authorities, particularly as in the eyes of the Committee 
on Budgetary Control it represents a model case. It belongs to a sector for 
which Parliament has called for a dynamic Community policy; what is more, the 
principles of cooperation between the enterprises, the universities and the 
research institutes, as well as the management procedures, are novel and 
appear promising. 
The programme, which is managed by a Task Force assjsted by experts and 
consultative bodies, has the following features: 
- it is a comprehensive whole of research and coordination activity; 
- the activities, carried out on the basis of contracts, require the 
participation of at least two associated but independent enterpris~s which 
may not be located in the same Member State; 
- 50% of the financing of these activities is provided by the Community. 
An investigation was carried out into the reasons for the various delays. It 
showed that the low rate of utilization of appropriations (for Item 7355-
Information technologies: 64.9% utilization of commitment appropriations and 
4% of payment appropriations; for Item 7730 - Preparatory measures: 100% 
utilization of commitment appropriations and 7% of payment appropriations) was 
caused by circumstances which do not reflect on the principles and methods of 
mana gem en t : 
- the decision to start the programme was taken rather late by the Council (on 
28 February 1984- OJ L 67 of 9.3.1984); 
- initiation of the procedures was hampered by difficulties in recruiting 
officials and contract staff; 
- the large number of proposals slowed down the assessment and selection; 
- negotiations for the conclusion of contracts proved difficult because the 
prospective partners needed to adapt their strategies· and their structures, 
even their cost accounting, to a new form of cooperation which was still 
being worked out; 
- the Task Force managed to bring about the association of heretofore 
i11dependent enterprises into groups (averaging five partners each); this 
meant, however, that there were difficulties and delays in connection with 
the signing and circulation of documents; 
v d.er delays arose because of the procedures for the payment of Community 
contributions, but the contracting partners did not in all cases submit 
rheir accounts on time. 
Nevertheless, the teething troubles have been to a large extent overcome. The 
rate of implementation for 1985 is up: about 83% for commitment 
appropriations and 70% for payment appropriations at the end of the financial 
year. In the first months of 1986 utilization of appropriations will reach 
even higher levels. 
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The Court of Auditors has carried out an investigation of the programme's 
internal control systems and made the following observations: 
-criteria for commitment of appropriations do not seem to have been applied 
consistently. In some cases it was found that budgetary commitments were 
made before the contracts had been signed; 
-expenditure on staff having been fixed at 4.5X of the programme's total 
endowment, the Court of Auditors considers that methods of controlling the 
level of this expenditure are insufficiently precise, and indeed that the 
terms of the decision setting up the programme are imprecise; 
- some assessment procedures on research proposals and contract approval 
could, according to the Court of Auditors, be improved. 
The Commission has given an assurance that it will take account of the Court 
of Auditors' recommendations. 
The Commission has also had an assessment of the first stage of the 
implementation of the programme carried out by a group of independent 
experts. The results of this inquiry1, based on the replies received from 
131 organization!; and 238 questionnaires returned by the participants, show 
that ESPRIT is approaching its objective~ and that it is making more rapid 
progress than expected: European-level cooperation between enterprises, 
universities and research institutions is now a fact, and it is a success. 
The Commission has accepted the conclusions of the experts' report and has, 
notably, agreed for the future to: 
-consolidate and readjust the programme in certain areas to take account of 
recent developments in information technologies; 
- set up strictl s 
practical resu_l_ts 
- ensure continuity of research. 
It would be useful in future to streamline the procedures of staff recruitment 
(officials and contract staff) and those for the payment of contributions to 
the enterprises. 
2. THE CASE OF TURKEY 
The Third Financial Protocol with Turkey of 12 May 1977 provides for the 
granting of 220 m ECU in loans on special conditions to be financed from the 
Community budget. These amounts were fully committed during the financial 
years 1978-1981. In subsequent years the EIB, which acts on behalf of the 
Community, was responsible for effecting payments. The payment appropriations 
for 1984 were laid down by the budgetary authority as 5 m ECU (Item 9630: 
'Third Financial Protocol with Turkey'). 
1 The mid-term review of ESPRIT. Report submitted to the Commission of the 
European Communities by the ESPRIT Review Board, 15 October 1985 
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Draft amendments aiming to block these appropriations did not pass in 
Parliament. 
At the beginning of the 1984 financial year the EIB, after consulting the 
Turkish Government, submitted to the Commission an estimate of expenditure for 
1984 of the ord~r of 60 m ECU. 
The Commission then included in the Supplementary and Amending Budget No. 
1/1984 a request for a further 46 m ECU of appropriations. The request was, 
however, turned down by the Council and was not supported by Parliament. 
Following the rejection of the first request, the Commission made a new 
request to increase the budget line concerned by means of transfer proposal 
32/84 which provided for the transfer of 32m ECU from Title 8 to Item 9630. 
Once agdin the response of the budgetary authority was negative. 
~s regards the Council, whose competence in this case was decisive, the 
~xp~nditure being of a compulsory nature, the Commission suggests that its 
refusal 1111as motivated by •technical considerationst. 
As for Parliament, its attitude expressed a ~efusal to authorize new financing 
as well as its determination not to block settlement of commitments already 
entered into. 
The Commission found itself in a situation where it was facing expenditure 
exceeding the estimates, while the Community's creditors could go before the 
courts to demand payment of their claims. The Commission, availing itself of 
the technique of transfers between articles within the same chapter, was able 
to act without authorization and get together 17 570 m ECU which it put into 
Item 9630. 
It could be said that ~he Commission has disregarded the decisions of the 
budgetary authority. It should, however, be noted that the budgetary 
authority had not taken a decision to block all fayments already committed. 
The Commission was in a difficult osition. As or the Council it had failed 
to ru e on the substance o 
3. Development aid 
Community development aid policy enjoys wide support both in Europe and in 
international public opinion. It expresses the solidarity of the Community 
~ith the developing countries and the figures show that such solidarity is not 
m~iely a matter of lip service: in 1984, 1 853 m ecu1 were paid by the 
Community as development aid, while payments under the budget as a whole 
amounted to 27 523 m ECU. This puts_ development aid policy in third place 
among Community policies after agricultural policy and social policy, but 
ahead of regional policy and ~1ergy and research policy. The year 1984 in 
this sector was characterized by definite progress in the operation of 
procedures and the implementation of appropriations. The Court of Auditors 
had no fundamental criticisms to make. 
1 including non-budgetized EDF 
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Of course major problems still exist: the management procedures for food aid 
do not allow of proper planning, the budgetization of the EDF has not always 
been achieved and the difficulties encountered on the spot very often hinder 
effective action. The institutional implications of these problems do not 
make their resolution any easier • 
..;..P..::a..;..r~l.;.;i a:;.:m.:.:.;e;:.:.n~t;.....;i..::s~f.;;.o,;.l.;.;l o:;.;w~i;.;.n~g;:..,.;:c~l~o.;s~e~l '--t;:.;h.:..;e;-..;i.;;;m~l.;;.em;.;;.e~n;.;.t;.;a~t~i;..;;o;.;.;n~o..;.f....;.t h;.;.1.;.;· s~~;..;..;;;"- and i s 
grateful to the Court of Au 1tors or 1ts construct1ve which 
enabled the Commission to improve its management. 
4. Agricultural expenditure 
Alongside the exhaustion of own resources, the development of agricultural 
expenditure helped to bring about the current budgetary crisis. Taking the 
objective of the common agricultural policy as established, some of this 
expenditure is irreducible, in particular where it is a question of assuring 
farmers a reasonable income. Political obstacles, which have hitherto been 
insurmountable, have also prevented the hoped-for alignment of Community 
prices and world prices, thus maintaining a high level of refunds. Other 
agricultural expenditure, however, is more directly dependent on management: 
expenditure on storage. 
The financial year 1984 recorded a deterioration in the problem of public 
stocks and, more generally, Community stocks. The following figures clearly 
illustrate the problem: 
Public storage expenditure 
Value of products in public 
storage1 
1983 
2 007 
7 035 
1984 (in m ECU) 
2 710 (+ 35%) 
8 751 (+ 24%) 
The increase in these two principal financial items relating to public storage 
(expenditure on storage and value of stocks> was thus considerable in 1984, 
but this phenomenon has been constantly present throughout the last three or 
four financial years. 
As the sums absorbed by storage policy are in themselves considerable 
(expenditure on storage in 1984 was almost equivalent to the total payments 
under the Social and Regional Funds) and exhibit a constant rising trend, one 
wonders whether corrective measures cannot be introduced in the management of 
future financial years. 
Expenditure on storage falls into the category of expenditure which is 
considered 'inevitable' because it is designed to re-establish market balance 
(with the refund expenditure). The inevitable nature of such expenditure, 
however, relates to the stage of buying-in for storage at the time when 
intervention is required to cope with the surpluses produced; it does not 
however, relate either to the market management measures which affect the 
formation of surpluses (principally to the prices fixed by the Council), or to 
the resultant stock management, the duration and conditions of storage for 
which involve the greatest expenditure. 
1 As at 31 November of the financial year: this is second category 
expenditure resulting from intervention operations during the period from 
December to November (Regulation No. 3184/83) 
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Th~ aspect of the question which mainly entails action by the Commission and 
its responsibility is the management of stocks and the associated expenditure. 
The management expenditure can be subdivided into expenditure connected with 
the technical and financial costs of storage and, secondly, expenditure 
involved in the disposal of stocks; the former relates to the technical 
aspects of storage and the locking-up of capital; the latter serves to finance 
the losses resulting from the difference between the purchase price on storage 
and the resale price. In both cases it can be said that the Commission must 
make an effort to improve its management in order to reduce the financial 
burden on the Community. Better turnover of stocks can: 
- reduce the quantity and the value of the products in storage; 
- reduce the ageing of the goods while avoiding the risk of losses at the time 
of resale. 
The Commission quite obviously runs the risk of encountering considerable 
difficulties in its efforts to speed up the turnover of stocks; it does not, 
however, lack the means (export refunds, special measures for disposal on the 
internal market, commercial agreements, etc.) and these would enable it to 
achieve considerable positive results. 
For example, as the Commission acknowledges1, the increase in the value of 
stocks and in the expenditure in 1984 were largely caused by the difficulties 
in disposing of butter surpluses (increasing from 685 000 to 978 000 tonnes) 
and by the losses suffered in the selling price of this product respectively; 
disposal also therefore involved considerable losses because of the ageing of 
the stocks (about half was on the point of reaching the two-year age limit 
beyond which the product loses the characteristics which make it suitable for 
consumption). A better turnover of stocks achieved by using the means 
indicated above would make it possible to reduce s~ocks and improve the 
quality, while reducing both the cost of locked-up capital and the costs 
connected with disposal. 
Finally the Commission is 
management from t e point o v1ew o accountancy: 1t as not so ar use the 
possibility provided for in Article 8 of the Regulation to depreciate the 
accounting value of the stocks by an amount equal to half the difference 
between the purchase price and the selling value. 
The failure to apply this depreciation criterion to latent losses does not 
seem to be in accordance with the principle of sound financial management, 
inasmuch as it involves: 
1 See XIVth financial report on the EAGGF - Guarantee Section (COMC85) 492 
final, p. 23) 
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-the creation of substanti3l latent charges which may materialize at any time 
(the Court of Auditors, which condemned this phenomenon, estimates such 
charges prudently at 2 500 m ECU); 
- an increase in expenditure on interest paid to national organizations 
responsible for storage in compensation for the capital they have had to 
lock up; as such interest is based on an over-estimated book value, it 
follows that the burden to be borne by the Community is greatly increased. 
It should also be pointed out that the Commission has taken account of the 
criticisms made in this connection by introducing two types of corrective 
measure: 
-publication of a note on the intervention stocks and the associated latent 
charges in addition to the management account; the Court of Auditors 
reserves the right in this connection to evaluate the assessment criteria 
used; 
-the introduction in the preliminary draft budget for 1986 of two budget 
lines (2920 and 2921) specially intended to cover the latent charges 
associated with the depreciation of butter and beef and veal; unfortunately 
the Commission was not backed up in this positive move to improve 
book-keeping: the Council deleted these two lines. 
From this point of view and from that of all the others mentioned, the 
Commission is invited to seek all possible means of imhroving stocklmanagement 
so that this type of expenditure comes completely, wit in the control of the 
Communit in the medium-term. It would be useful for it to sUbmit a ro ramme 
for running down stocks with1n an appropriate per1od of six mont s. 
5. Combating fraud 
The importance of combating fraud within the strategy for control of Community 
finance has been emphasized many times by Parliament during the discharge 
procedure; in its resolution of 18 May 1983 Parliament pointed to the need for 
the Commission and the Court to concentrate their efforts in regard to fraud, 
and in its resolution of 16 April 1985 it pointed out the need to intensify 
inquiries relating to a particular source of fraudulent activity: the criminal 
world of the Mafia. 
The legislative body has itself also noted the need to strengthen the systems 
for combating irregularities and frauds and has provided the Commission with a 
structured system of legal instruments in the sector which is most exposed to 
fraudulent pracices: that of the agricultural guarantee section. In this 
area, even though the most important responsibilities as regards control 
devolve on the Member States (Article 8 of Regulation 729/70, Directive 77/435 
on the systematic control of commercial documents and Articles 3, 4 and 5 of 
Regulation 283/72 on the notification of irregularities discovered), the 
Commission does not lack means to take action; it can in fact: 
- undertake special inqu1r1es, notably on-the-spot enquiries, with the formal 
obligation on the Member States to cooperate with it (Article 9 of 
Regulation 729/70 and Article 6 of Regulation 283/72); 
- exchange information with the administrations of the Member States and apply 
a system of mutual assistance in the customs sector (Article 4, 
Regulation 283/72 and Regulation 1468/81); 
- take measures to recover sums improperly paid (Regulation 283/72>. 
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This system is supplemented by specific control measures carried out by the 
Commission's Dirctorate-General of Financial Control. 
This generously equipped system of control instruments should make it possible 
to achieve good results in combating irregularities and frauds and, in fact, 
the figures for the last three years would see• to indicate a positive trend 
in this connection: 
Number of irregularities 
Amount (in ECU) 
1982 
218 
34 208 218 
1983 
176 
11 137 059 
1984 
126 
5 844 032 
There is thus an appreciable and constant reduction both in the number and in 
the value of the cases notified. These trends do not however appear to pacify 
the Commission and quite rightly: apart from the observations by the Court of 
Auditors1 which found that up to 1984 the cases of undue payments which had 
been recovered were not recorded in the statistics given since they were 
considered as irregularities without any financial implica2ions, there are two 
factors which make the Commission cautious in its approach : 
- not all cases of irregularities discovered in the Member States are perhaps 
notified to the Commission; 
- the number of cases notified by the Member States depends not only on the 
level of fraudulent activity on their territory but also on the 
effectiveness of the control measures applied at national level. 
It therefore seems obvious that the instruments placed at the disposal of the 
Commission are not in themselves sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the fight against fraud, if their operation is not effectively integrated with 
that of the national authorities. The Court of Auditors expresses grave 
reservations about the willingness of the Member States to accept enhanced 
forms of cooperation by pointing out3 how action at national level is 
distinguished by lack of collaboration in various areas (superficial 
inquiries, inadequate application of Directive 77/435. failure to notify 
attempted frauds). 
1Annual Report on the financial year 1984, p. 4.23 
2see XIVth Financial Report on the Guarantee Section of EAGGF, para. 7.5 
3see Annual Report, para. 4.28 
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The figures for recoveries reflect what could be a characteristic aspect of 
this inadequate interaction between the two national and Community levels: we 
need only look at the following table: 
Number of Number of % Sums involved Sums % 
irregular1t1es recover1es in irregularities recovered 
1984 126 34 27% 5 844 032 619 998 11% 
Total from 
1971 1 680 998 59% 131 985 922 36 831 651 28% 
The figures given above show the difficulties involved in recovering undue 
sums paid: less than 30% of the sums incorrectly paid have so far been 
recovered and this finding can only confirm the suspicion that the 
relationship established between the national authorities (administrative and 
legal) and the Community bodies is inadequate. 
The Commission does however have means of reacting to this state of affairs at 
three levels: 
-by using more obli e the 
Member States to keep their own nternal e 1c1ency un er rev1ew y 1mpos ng 
specific responsibilities on them; the Commission could for example make 
more frequent use of the procedures provided for in Articles 9 
(Regulation 729) and 6 (Regulation 283/72) which impose formal obligations 
on the Member States, and reduce the use of the 'pre-six' examination 
procedure which relies on the good will of the Member States; it could also 
take part more often in national legal proceedings as a third party, when 
the Member States do not pursue cases of fraud with the necessary severity; 
in general the national internal procedures should form the subject of 
closer surveillance in order to improve their efficiency; a recent proposal 
for amendment of Regulation (EEC) No. 1468/81 is designed to increase 
cooperation with the national authorities in the investigation of frauds in 
connection with products from third countries and incorrectly declared as 
being 'released for free circulation'; 
- by promoting the amendment of Community regulations on the basis of 
experience acquired in the area of fraud. The Commission has already taken 
steps in this direction and is amending the terms of the regulations so as 
to provide a better formulation of economic objectives; 
measures. By entering special budget 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~ 1nes or the creat1on of a tas force n t e 1986 financial year, the 
European Parliament hoped to encourage the Commission to greater 
coordination of the various monitoring procedures by its departments in 
cooperation also with the national services. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Parliament's decision on the discharge is above all political in character. 
After taking note of the results of the audit operations, it represents an 
assessment of the way in which the budget has been implemented by comparison 
with the guidelines and objectives laid down by the budgetary authorities. 
The guidelines laid down for 1984 and retained for subsequent years related 
essentially to: 
- combating unemployment, both by investment in production structures and by 
training measures; 
- support for key technologies; 
-strengthening development aid policy. 
The last two objectives have to a large extent been achieved. Despite cerrain 
shortcomings and administrative complexities, the Community's development aid 
now represents an appreciable and effective contribution to the effort to 
demonstrate solidarity with the developing countries. The policy to establish 
a European industry involving new technologies is also a reality, notably with 
the ESPRIT programme. 
On the other hand, the policy of solidarity between the regions and with 
respect to our most disadvantaged co-citizens, i.e. the unemployed, has 
neither the instruments nor the financial means necessary for there to be a 
perceptible impact by a Community policy as distinct from national efforts. 
However, on the whole, Parliament's assessment of the management in the 
financial year 1984 is favourable, having regard to the difficulties of the 
Community 1s budget crisis. Discharge is therefore granted to the Commission. 
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ANNEX 
·-
UTILIZATION Of BUOGET APPROPRIATIONS 
IN THE FINANCIAL YEAR ~~84 (sy"-ffTLE) 
---·- · ··cin -m-ecu~-~·---
SECTION III - COMMISSION 
Budget Nature of expenditure Final Utilization 
line appropri-
at ions• 
Commitments ··r Paymeri't"S' r 
·--""'---~---- --
Part 'A • 
Title 1 Expenditure relating 545.5 538.8 98e8% 533.7 97.8% 
to persons working with 
the institution 
Title 2 Buildings, equipment 274.5 272.4 99.3% 214 78% 
and miscellaneous 
operating expenditure 
Title 10 Other expenditure 0.1 
Part 'B' 
Titles 1 European Agricultural 
and 2 Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund - Guidance Section 
Nondifferentiated 18 354 18 330.8 99.9% 18 328.2 99.8% 
appropriations 
Title 3 European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund - Guidance Section, 
and specific agricultural 
measures: 
Differentiated 
appropriations: commitment 908 819.3 90.2% 
payment 615.1 565.3 91.9% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 51.8 51.2 98.9% 45.9 88.6% 
Title 4 Common policy on fisheries 
and the sea: 
Differentiated 
appropriations:commitment 121.9 66.2 54.3% 
payment 55.2 23.6 42.8% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 32.2 29.9 92.8% 22.9 71.3% 
*The commitment appropriations include those exi~ting at the •nd of the financial year 
1983 or made available by decommitments and adjustments to commitments c~rried over. 
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Budget Nature of expenditure Final Utilization 
line appropri-
at ions 
Commhments 2 Payments % 
Title 5 Appropriations for 
operations in the 
regional development 
sector 
Differentiated 
appropriations:commitment 2 500.8 2 429.5 97.1% 
payment 1 450.2 1 309.2 90.2% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 12.7 11.5 90.5% 0.2 1. 7% 
Title 6 Appropriations for 
operations in the 
social sector 
Differentiated 
appropriations:commitment 2 039.3 1 859.5 91.2% 
payment 1 219.1 1 117.9 91.7% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 419 416.2 99.3% 391.5 93.4% 
Title 7 Appropriations for 
operations in the 
energy, industry 
and technology, 
research, nuclear 
safeguards and 
information market 
and innovation sectors 
Differentiated 
appropriations:commitment 1 129.9 777.4 68.8% 
payment 667.4 440.2 66.0% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 1 028.9 1 028.3 99.9% 906.3 88.1% 
Title 8 Repayments and aid to 
Member States, loan 
guarantees and 
miscellaneou~ 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 1 083.2 1082.5 99.9% 1 073.8 99.1% 
Title 9 Cooperation with the 
developing countries and 
non-member countries 
Differentiated 
appropriations:commitment 624.9 477.9 76.5% 
payment 310.5 175.1 56.4% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 721.7 721.1 99.9% 591.9 82% 
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Budget Nature of expenditure Final Utilization 
l1ne appropri-
at ions 
Comm-Itments 2 Payments 2 
Title 10 Other expenditure 
Differentiated 
appropriations:commitment 
payment 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 
Total Differentia ted 
Part 'B' appropriations:commitment 7 324.9 6 429.8 87.8% 
payment 4 317.5 3 631.4 84.1% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 21 707.5 21 671.5 99.8% 21 360.6 98.4% 
GRAND Differentiated 
TOTAL appropriations:commitment 7 324.9 6 429.8 87.8% 
payment 4 317.5 3 631.4 84.1% 
Non-differentiated 
appropriations 22 527.5 22 482.7 99.8% 22 108.3 98.1% 
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ANNEX 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT B 2-895/85) 
tabled by Mr FICH, Mr ARNOT, Mrs GREDAL, Mr CHRISiiANSEN 
and Mr GLINNE 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the Commission's decision to grant aid to Turkey from 
the Third Financial Protocol in the 1984 budgetary year 
---------- -----. 
The European Parliament, 
-------. 
. ., 
having regard to the Third Financial Protocol between the European 
Community and Turkey signed on 12 May 1977, 
having regard to Parliament's repeated condemnation of human rights 
violations in Turkey, 
having regard to the fact that both Parliament and the Council rejected 
the proposal to increase funds for the Third Financial Protocol as 
envisaged by the Commission in preliminary draft supplementary budget 
No. 1/84, 
naving regard to the fact that both Parliament and the Council rejected 
the Commission's request to transfer funds from Chapter 7 to Chapter 9 in 
f1vour of the Third Financial Protocol, 
~aving regard to the Commission's decision to transf~r funds within 
Cha~ter 96 in favour of the Third F~nancial Protocol and thus enable 
29 ~illion ECU to be paid in 1984. although only 5 million ECU was 
provided by the budgetary authority (Council ar~ PQrliament> in the ~984 
budget, 
Cor.d~~s ~he int~rnal transf~r of f~nds by the Commission~ which it r:gards 
as a delioerate flout1ng of the btJdgetary autnority's decision r~?garJ·.ng 
aid to Turkey and as contravening the spirit of the budgetary procedure; 
~e~re:s the fact. that, by this conduct, the Commission has undermined the 
~fforcs to restore respect fvr human rights ~n Turkey; 
~. ~alls on the Co~rt of Auditcrs to consider within the framework of ~ts 
~~nua~ repcrt for 1984 whether this internal transfer of funds const1tutes 
a lo'iolation of the principles of the budaetary procedure; 
~. Inter:ds, .lur;pg the dis-:har·qe procedure for 1984, to examine the po~i::·:cal 
re•~~~si~ility of the Commission dnd of the Commissioners concerned for 
tnis decision on aid to Turkey; 
5. Asks the Com.nission to ensure that ~o.Jch practices do not recur in f,J::ure. 
- 36 - PE 103.713/fin./Ann. 
.... 
' 
OPINION 
(Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Political Affairs Committee 
Draftsman: Mr SABY 
At its meeting of 19 November 1985, the Political Affairs Committee appointed 
Mr SABY draftsman of an opinion. 
At its meeting of 22 January 1986, the committee considered the draft opinicn 
and adopted its conclusions by 22 votes to 5 with 5 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr FORMIGONI, chairman; Mr HANSCH, first 
vice-chairman; Mr SABY, draftsman; Mr ALMEIDA MENDES, Mr BALFE (deputizing for 
Mr AMADEI), Mr BERNARD-REYMOND, Mr BLUMENFELD, Mr CAAMANO BERNAL, Mr DANKERT 
(deputizing for Mrs CHARZAT), Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr FILINIS (deputizing for 
Mr CERVETTI>, Mr B. FRIEDRICH, Mr HABSBURG, Mr KOLOKOTRONIS (deputizing for 
Mr GLINNE), Mrs LENZ, Mr LOMAS, Mr MALLET (deputizing for Mr ANTONIOZZI), 
Mr MEDEIROS FERREIRA, Mr MEDINA ORTEGA, Mr NEWENS, Mr PENDERS, Mr PERREIRA 
(deputizing for Mr BETTIZA), Mrs PIERMONT; Mr PIRKL (deputizing for 
Mr CALVO SOTELO), Mr PLANAS PUCHAOES, Mr POETTERING, Mr PRAG, Mr SEAL 
(deputizing for Mr SEEFELD), Mr SELVA (deputizing for Mr ERCINl), 
Mr SUTRA DE GERMA (deputizing for Mr JOSPIN>,,Mr TZOUNIS (deputizing for 
Mr CROUX), Mr WALTER and Mr WEDEKIND (deputizing for Mr KLEPSCH). 
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The Political Affairs Committee has considered the issue raised by the 
author of the motion for a resolution in auest.ion. It appears that, despite 
the budgetary authority's refusal to increase appropriations under the 
financial protocol with Turkey and its decision to enter only 5 mill.ion ECU in 
the 1984 budget, the Commission transfer~ed resources within Chapter 96 to 
allow payment of 29 •illion ECU in 1984. 
The motion for a resolution argues that the Commission has: 
- defied the budgetary authority's decision on aid to Turkey, and 
- compromised the success of the efforts being made to restore respect for 
human rights in Turkey. 
In examining this issue from the political vie~point, this committee 
recalled the content of the report by Mr BALFE on the human rights situation 
in Turkey (Doc. A 2-117/85>, which was adopted by Parliament on 23 Oct0ber 
1985 and which confirmed that a resumption of normal relations between the 
Community and Turkey within the framework of the association agreement, 
including the provision of financial aid, depended on full respect for 
democratic liberties within Turkey. 
The Political Affairs Committee found that the budgetary authority nad 
indeed refused to grant new appropriations in excess of the 5 million ECU 
entered in the 1984 buget, but noted that no specific reference had been made 
to the commitments already entered into by the Community. In addition, 
Parliament's political resolve to honour former commitments (pre-dating 
31 October 1981) was confirmed by the rejection of amendments aimed at 
preventing the allocation of resources to the relevant budget item. It was 
the Council itself which invited the Commission to make a transfer, in 
accordance with the Financial Regulation, within Chapter 96. It shoul~ ~e 
borne in mind, moreover, that, as specified by Mr Delors in his answer to a 
related Question at the sitting of 13 November 1985, Community contributions 
are not received by the Turkish Government, but are paid to European 
undertakings for projects embarked upon in accordance with financing contracts 
concluded before 31 October 1981. •. 
In his answer to the same Question, the President of the Council, Mr ?oos, 
pointed out that the Council, while rejecting an increase, had made it clear 
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in its explanatory memorandum that the appropriation against the item in 
question could be increased via the transfer procedure in duly substant1ated 
circu•stances. 
The Political Affairs Committee realizes that-, by restricting itself to 
payments in respect of commitments entered into before the end of 
·October 1981, the Commission did comply with the Community policy of not 
entering into fresh commitments with Turkey. 
Nevertheless, the Political Affairs Committee notes that the eauivocal 
attitude maintained by the Commission was politically prejudicial to 
Parliament's decisions on the matter. 
In consequence, the Political Affairs Committee would point out that tne 
charges made against the Commission in the motion for a resolution under 
consideration cannot relate to commitments entered into before 31 October 1981. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
Draftsman: Mr ADAM 
On 22 January 1986 the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
appointed Mr ADAM draftsman of the opinion for the Committee on Budgetary 
Control on the discharge for the financial year 1984. 
The Committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 22 January 
1986 and 24 February 1986. It adopted the draft opinion on 24 February 1986 
unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote:- Mr PONIATOWSKI, Chairman; 
Mr SALZER, Vice-Chairman; Mr SELIGMAN, Vice-Chairman; Mr ADAM, rapporteur; 
Mr BONACCINI (deputizing for Mr IPPOLITO), Mr CROUX (deputizing for 
Mr CIANCAGLINI), Mr ESTGEN, Mr GARCIA AMIGO (deputizing for Mr TURNER), 
Mr KOLOKOTRONIS, Mr LINKOHR, Mr MALLET, Mr RIGO (deputizing for Mrs LIZIN), 
Mr SANZ FERNANDEZ, Mr SPATH, Mr TRIDENTE, Sir Peter VANNECK (deputizing for 
Mr TOKSVIG), Mrs VIEHOFF and Mr WEST. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Committee on Energy is competent for the following chapters of the 
budget: Chapters 70, 71, 72, 73 and 75 and, in Chapter 77, articles 770-77~ 
inclusive. 
2. The present opinion relates to the comment¥ set out in Chapter 9 of the 
report 2f the Court of Auditors <ECA) for 1984, and the Commission's replies 
thereto and to the utilisation of appropriations in the relevant budgetary 
chapters, especially the appropriations amended by the European P~rliament in 
the course of the budgetary procedure for the financial year 1984. 
3. Attention is drawn to the Amending and Supplem~ntary Budget number 1 of 
the European Communities for the finanical year 1984 • Attention is drawn to 
the tables and chart annexed to the present opinion. 
II. BUDGETARY OBJECTIVES 
4. The permanent overall objectives should be:-
(a) budgetary transparency; and 
(b) a clear logic running through both the organisation of the Community's 
actions in this sector and their budgetary presentation. 
5. In the interests of operational efficiency and democratic scrutiny we 
should be moving towards a situation in which Community actions in energy, 
research and technology run in the following cycle: studies - programmes -
evaluation. 
6. For various reasons, the rate of utilisation of appropriations is not 
always a very good criterion for evaluating a programme of Community action. 
If, however, there is to be a shift away from this criterion towards a finer 
qualitative assessment, the onus is on the Commission to provide Parliament 
with a greater amount of qualitative data. In particular, it should try to 
ensure that progress reports are delivered to Parliament before proposals for 
the renewal of programmes and before requests for substantical increases in 
budqet fundinq. 
7. In future a better balance must be struck between two types of evaluation: 
financial and qualitative. 
8. Attention is drawn to the resolution of 10 October 1985 by which the 
European Parliament decided tg establish an office for scientific and 
technological option assessment • Such an office could contribute to the 
qualitative assessment of Community action, in line with paragraph 4 of the 
above-mentioned resolution which referred to 11 th7, particular needs of the 
standing rommittees (of the European Parliament) and political groups in 
tPchnological and political decision-making, which can be made only by an 
autonomous technological assessment office." 
,-----------------------
OJ C326, 16 DecemhPr 1985, pp 76-79 i ibid, pp 194-195 
4 See the table on utilisation rates annexed to this opinion (Annex 1) 
5 OJ L329, 17 December 1984 
6 OJ C288, 11 November 1985 - Linkohr report (Doc. A2-94/85> 
words in parentheses added 
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9. In its discharge opinion for 1983 this Committee asked the Commission to 
improve the clarity of the presentation of its financial out-turn. For 1984 
the Commission (DG XII> provided a detailed working paper on the execution of 
the research budget for which it is warmly thanked. It is to be hoped that 
this can become an annual practice on the part of all the Commission 
Directorate-Generals concerned. 
III. ENERGY 
Ci) Deaonstration projects 
10. A generally good rate of utilisation of commitment appropriations is to 
be noted, and although the rate for payments was noticeably less good, each of 
the lines in question registered an improvement in rate of utilisation as 
compared with 1983. 
11. In 1983, there had been the problem of a late Council decision, which 
explained the measure of utilisation. At the end of 1984, 28.8 MECU in ' 
payment appropriations lapsed because they had not been used either in 1983 or 
1984. It is not clear why this money could not be used in 1984, when the 
Commission received over 800 proposals under the demonstration projects 
programmes. 
<ii) Invest•ents in the rational use of energy 
12. The Commission's proposal for this programme (Article 705) had never been 
adopted by the Council in spite of having received a favourable opinion from 
the European Parliament. In 1984, no less than 20 MECU were available in the 
budget to be committed. Because of the lack of legal bas~, none of the money 
was spent in the manner intended by the budgetary authority. In the end, a 
transfer was made so that the money could be used for famine relief to the 
Sahel region of Africa. This in itself was no bad use for the money, but the 
overall sequence of events were a travesty of the correct use of the Community 
budget. 
13. The ECA has recommended that "present systems of internal and external 
technical evaluation be expanded to provide a clearer assessment of the 
likelihood of commercial exploitation for each objective within a completed 
project" as the basis for "an improved follow-up of projects". 
14. The Commission has replied that it is examining how to introduce a system 
of periodic requests to all contractors for information. This Committee is 
aware of the Commisgion's man-power difficulties, which impede the exhaustive 
monitnrin~ of the larqe nuimber of projects. NeverthelPss, it hopes that it 
wil I. hP. ahi.P tn brinq in th~~> nPw follow-up system soon. 
(iii) Nuclear safeguards 
15. Chapter 71 relates to nuclear safeguards, including the work of the 
nuclear inspectorate. The nuclear inspectorate faces a chronic manpower 
problem, as is shown by the statistics relating to the size of the 
inspectorate and the number of inspections carried out in 1984 and 1985, which 
are set out below. Recently, Parliament was able somewhat to alleviate the 
problem, by creating an additional 28 posts in the 1986 budget. 
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Inspections 1984 man/days 6051 
carried out 1985 6215 
Inspections 1984 1787 
number 1985 1876 
Inspectors end 1984 130 
end 1985 122 
1986 126 (+28) 
Estimated theoretical number of man/days 
which ought to have been reached 12000 
16. Turning to Item 712 <samples and analyses>, it is surprising that no less 
than 250.000 ECU out of the 960.000 entered in the budget were available for 
transfer to development and disaster aid, not counting another 50.000 
transferred to two other lines in Chapter 71. 
IV. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
(i) Preparatory studies (chapter 72) 
17. In its opinion on the 1983 discharge7, this Committee approved the 
Commission's stated intention of entering appropriations for preparatory 
studies for research which had hitherto been non-differentiated appropriations 
in chapter 72, in chapter 73 in future, as differentiated appropriations. 
This change has not yet been implemented, and a statement by the Commission on 
its plans for this chapter would be welcome. 
<ii) Research (chapter 73) 
18. The year 1984 was the first covered by the EC Framework Programme for 
scientific and technical research. 
19. The Commission faced a major problem of delay over the approval by the 
Council of eight important programmes. In the end, the Council only decided 
on the programmes on 12 March 1985. The budgetary authority had made 
provisions in the 1984 budget (and the supplementary budget) for the start of 
these programmes, but clearly it was not possible to spend the appropriations 
in 1984. 
20. In its replies to the ECA report, the Commission has said that, but for 
this problem the utili sat ion rate for indirect action research programmes 
would have been 88% for commitments and 89% for payments. 
21. A table supplied by the Coftmission is annexed to this opinion showing the 
history of the eight proposals. 
22. Also annexed is a pie-chart prepare~ by the Commission showing the 
distribution of resources under chapter 73. The four major categories are 
ESPRIT, JRC, fusion <including JET) and indirect action (i.e. shared-cost and 
concerted-action projects). 
~-;;-~~~~;~;;~~---------
9 Annex II 
Annex III 
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23. The table in annex II showing the fate of the 8 proposals adopted in 
March 1985 shows the difficulties which arise when the Council enters "amounts 
considered necessary" which do not reflect - indeed, which distort - the 
intentions enshrined in the framework programme strategy. 
24. JET - The JET finances for 1984 were the subject of a special report by 
the ECA, which approved the financial statements. However, the Court had 
certain observations on changes in accounting methods, management of 
appropriations, internal control and loss of bank interest. 
25. In particular, the ECA noted that at the end of 1984, appropriations for 
payments amounting to 15.7 MECU had to be cancelled at JET, although this 
situation was foreseeable. Further, the ECA repeated a recommendation that 
JET should carry out on-the-spot checking of the original supporting 
documentation in respect of invoices received from the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority <UKAEA> for goods and services. 
26. Contract delays - When appropriations are underused, the reason is 
sometimes a delayed Council decision, but there is sometimes another kind of 
delay - one caused by the Commission's internal procedures. The programme for 
stimulation of scientific and technical potential (item 7351) is a case in 
point. In 1984, this programme was already underway and entering its second 
phase. The call for proposals was made on 4 February; but the decisions on 
the granting of support were not taken until 18 July, and the completion of 
contracts dragged on until the end of the year. This procedure was 
unacceptably slow, especially bearing in mind that in 1983, after a late 
Council decision, the whole procedure for the first phase had been completed 
between 8 July and 28 December. 
27. The general administrative problems arising in the Commission are of two 
types: 
(a) Firstly, scrutiny within the Commission can lead to lengthy negotiations 
and rev1 s1on of proposals and adjustment of the parties involved. While 
technically this procedure may be justified, it is not clear that there are 
real benefits ultimately to the research programme. An acceptance or 
rejection of proposals as presented would be quicker and the Commission is 
invited to justify the administrative procedures used. It must be added that 
these procedures cause difficulties for small- and medium-sized businesses; 
(b) Secondly, the time taken between acceptance of a proposal and the 
completion of the contract must be reduced. The average time is almost twelve 
months whereas in a normal industrial situation 3 or 4 months would be the 
norm. This problem is well attested in Commission documents. The Commission 
should be pressed to bring forward urgent proposals to reduce this 
unacceptable time lag. 
(iii) Technology (Item 7335, ch. 75, and articles 770-773) 
28. ESPRIT - This was the first year of operation and a decision to go 
forward was not made until 28 February 1984 (Item 7335). High commitments and 
low payments were always foreseen in the early days, with payments being about 
25% of commitment and this pattern changing later in the programme. There 
were 441 applications but only 20% were accepted, indicating the amount of 
office work that was necessary. Negotiation takes place with applicants, often 
involving reorientation of proposals. Until recently, there was a delay in 
signing contracts caused by the fact that the contract had to be sent round 
all the partners in a project successively (five being the average number of 
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partners) so that all could sign. The Commission says this delay has now been 
reduced by the introduction of a parallel signing procedure in which each 
partner gets a copy to sign, and the Director-General of the Task Force 
finally signs all the copies and gives an attestation on each that all other 
partners have signed. The Commission pays its share of the cost within an 
average period of approximately nine months. 
29. As far as other Task Force operations are concerned, the level of 
expenditure in 1984 was satisfactory. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Stresses the need for both parts of the budgetary authority to take into 
account the priorities estabished in the Community's framework programme for 
scientific and technical research when deciding on the level of appropriations 
in the budget, and for all parties concerned to ensure that these priorities 
are reflected in the annual execution of the research budget; this is 
emphasised in the light of experience in 1984, the first year of the framework 
programme, and with a view to the forthcoming proposal for a new framework 
programme. 
2. In general, the Committee is satisfied with the rate of utilisation of 
appropriations for energy, research and technology in 1984, subject to the 
detailed considerations set out in this opinion. 
3. As regards ESPRIT, the Committee accepts the reasons given by the 
Commission for the low rate of use of payment appropriations, but points out 
that this could have been better forecasted by the Commission at the outset, 
and emphasises the importance which it attaches to making the fullest use of 
the admittedly limited resources which have been made available for this very 
important Community activity. 
4. With regard to the execution of shared-cost research programmes (indirect 
action), the Committee recognises the distinction between some of the older 
Community programmes and certain new ones which have a strategic role under 
the framework programme; accordingly, it proposes to place the execution of 
the 7 programmes adopted by the Council on 12 March 1985 under especially 
close scrutiny in the coming years and invites the Committee on Budgetary 
Control to cooperate with it in this. 
5. Draws attention to the evidence provided by experience with the energy 
demonstration projects programme, nuclear inspection activities and certain 
research activities to the effect that efficient execution of the budget in 
particular is largely a function of the availability of trained staff in 
appropriate numbers. 
6. Requests the Commission to take note of the various points mentioned in 
the present opinion and, in particular, of the desirability of providing 
Parliament with a detailed report on budget execution by each relevant 
Commission department. 
7. Reafffirms its insistence on qualitative evaluation as an integral 
element in the assessment of budget execution and requests further assistance 
from the Commission in this. 
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Table 9.1 -Research, energy, etc.: Appropriatioas available In 1984 and their utilization 
Commitments 
Ex~nditure area Appropriations Commitments Afcpropriations (chapter of budget) for commit· 
entered into in Utilization rate or payment 
ment available 1984 ('lo) available in 
ml984(') 1984 (2) 
Energy: 
-
Energy policy (70 excluding 707) 216,9 204,8 94,4 206,0 
- Specific Community measures (707) 456,0 456,0 100,0 457,8 
Research and investment: (73) 
-
Direct action research 219,3 189,3 6,3 220,0 
-
Indirect action research (l) 386,6 268,9 69,5 307,9 
-
Information technology 
(Esprit) 207,0 134,4 64,9 45,0 
Industry and the internal market: (77) 
-
Industrial policy 29,0 26,8 92,4 36,4 
-
Information and telecommunications 
technologies other than 
Esprit 45,7 17,6 38,5 50,8 
Transport: 
-
Transport policy (78 excluding 783) 96,7 16,7 17,3 45,4 
- Special projects (on transport 
infrastructure) (783) 471,0 471,0 100,0 471,0 
Other activities: 
-
Nuclear safeguards (71) 3,0 3,0 100,0 4,2 
-
Information market and 
innovation (75) 23,9 13,6 56,9 20,1 
-
Miscellaneous (72) 3,7 3,6 97,3 6,0 
Total 2 158,8 1805,7 83,6 1870,6 
Note: Comparable figures for JET(') 114,3 83,5 73,0 142,2 
----- -~-- - -
t') Appropriations in the 1984 budget, plus appropriations remaining at the end of 1983, after transfers. 
(') Appropriations in the 1984 budget. plus carry·overs from 1983, after transfers. 
(l) lr.clud1ng contribution to JET (89 Mio ECU). 
( 4 ) Based on JErs budget (i.e. including Commission contribution). 
(~) Of wh1ch 106,2 llho ECU are shown as research ~rsonnel expenditure. 
(•) Of v.hich 18,9 Mio ECU are shown as research personnel expenditure. 
(') Of which 0,9 Mio ECU are shown as research personnel expenditure. 
SOURCE ECA report on the 1984 financial year 
OJ C326, 16 December 1985, p.77 
Payments 
Paymems 
made in 1984 
133,7 
412,0 
189,9(l) 
249,3(6} 
1,8(') 
17,7 
26,3 
6,8 
423,9 
2,5 
8,9 
2,9 
1475,7 
95,2 
(MioECU) 
Utilization rate 
(%) 
64.9 
90,0 
86,3 
80,1 
4,0 
48,6 
51,8 
15,0 
90,0 
59,5 
44.3 
48,3 
78,9 
66,9 
---
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SUBJECT EIGHT PROGRAMMES APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL ON 12 MARCH 1985 
~ATIONS COMMISSION EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
on ECU) PROPOSAL PARLIAMENT p 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
* 
** 
ACN 2 years**** ACN erogr.***** 
FUSION 790/ 5 years 790/ 5 years 342 690/5 * 
RADIATION PROTECTION 94/ 5 years 94/ 5 years 35 58/5 
RADIOACTIVE W~STE .92/ 5 years 92/ 5 years 35 62/5 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 88.5/ 5 years 88.5/ 5 years 35 55/5 ** 
STH1ULATION 40/ 2 years 40/ 2 years 35 60/4 
BRITE 170/ 4 years 170/ 4 years 65 125/4 
NON-NUCLEAR ENERGIES 379+35/ 4.5 years 379+35/ 4.5 years 95 175/4 
REACTOR SAFETY 81.3/ 4 years 81.3/ 4 years *** *** 
The main effect of the reduction is to extend the technological programme over a longer 
period than initially planned. 
The Council notes that for biotechnology it refers only to the scientific and technical 
content set out in document 10882/84 RECH 113 ATO 106 COR 2. 
*** 
**** 
The programme is taken over by the JRC. 
Amounts considered necessary which the Commission stated it intended to commit in 1985 
and 1986. 
***** Amounts considered necessary appearing in the programme decision. 
' 
SOURCE THE COIVII•IlSSION 
l):o 
IZ 
IZ 
1m 
IX 
I 
II-< 
, ...... 
MAJOR BUDGET CATEGORIES - COMMITMENT APPROPRIATIONS 
1984 BUDGET 
(million ECU) 
Shared-cost and 
concerted-actio 
projects 
ESPRIT 
23 % 28 % 
ESPRIT 
JRC 
FUSION/JET 
23 
FUSION/JET 
SHARED-COST/ 
CONCERTED-ACTION 
PROJECTS 
28 % 
26 % 
23 % 
: 23 % 
JRC 
SOURCE THE COMMISSION 
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(Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
Draftsman: Mrs Raymonde DURY 
On 18 December 1985, the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
appointed Mrs DURY draftsman of the opinion. 
The Committee considered the draft opinion.at its meeting of 
24 February 1986. It adopted the opinion unanimously at its meeting of 
25 February 1986. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr WELSH, Chairman; Mrs DURY, 
draftsman; Mr ALVAREZ DE PAZ; Mrs d'ANCONA; Mr BACHY; Mr BARROS MOURA (deputizing 
for Mr ALAVANOS); Mr CABRERA BAZAN; Mrs CASSANMAGNAGO-CERRETTI; Mr CONDESSO 
(deputizing for Mr PININFARINA); Mr CRESPO; Mr FITZGERALD; Mr HERRERO MEREDIZ; 
Mr LACERDA DE QUEIROZ; Mrs LARIVE-GROENENDAAL; Mrs MARINARO (deputizing for 
Mrs HOFFMANN); Mr MEGAHY; Mr PAPAKYRIAZIS; Mr PORDEA (deputizing 
for Mr LE CHEVALLIER); Mr RAGGIO; Mr SAKELLARIOU (deputizing for Mr PETERS); Mr 
SUAREZ GONZALEZ; Mr TUCKMAN. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARK 
1. 1984 saw the first year of operation of the European Social Fund under the 
new rules adopted following a far-reaching reform of the Fund to which the 
European Parliament had rightly attached the greatest importance and in ~hich 
it had tried to play an active and indeed decisive part. Its objectiv~ at 
every stage in the process was to ensure that the fund, as "the most important 
instrument of employment policy established by the Treaties", should, in a 
period of continuing and, indeed, worsening unemployment, "respond more 
satisfactorily to the needs of the situation"1 • 
2. It should be noted that many of the views set out below were voiced during 
1 
the hearing on the administration of the European Social Fund organised by the 
Committee on Social Affairs and Employment on 31 January 1986; this applies 
especially to the lack of clarity of the guidelines, the slowness in process~ng 
applications and, perhaps above all, the delays both in paying out advances and 
in settling final payment claims. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
a) Regrets that, in the light of the information set out in the 
Commission's and the Court of Auditors' reports on the Social Fund for the 
year under review, the Fund's performance in 1984 fell far short of 
Parliament's legitimate expectations for a number of reasons, including the 
failure on the part of the Commission, despite Parliament's repeated 
insistence, to consult it on the guidelines for the operation of the Fu~d 
over the period 1984 - 1986; 
Resolution of 17 May 1983, closing the procedure for consultation of the European 
Parliament on the proposal from the Commission of the European Communiti~s to the 
Council for a Regulation to implement a Council Decision on the tasks of the 
European Social Fund, OJ C 161, 20.6.83, p. 51 
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b) Notes that the Commission's report in itself also leaves much to be 
desired and that in particular it fails to throw clearly into relief from 
the very start the crucial fact that this is the first year of operation 
under a new set of rules, let alone to recapitulate, albeit briefly, the 
essential content and direction of these rules; this is to some extent, but 
not altogether, a matter of presentation; 
c) While welcoming the details given by the Commission concerning both its 
interpretation of the different priorities set out in the guidelines and 
concrete examples of the types of project carried out in each case, 
deplores the fact that virtually no attempt has been made to comment, 
albeit tentatively, on the performance of the Fund so far under its new 
rules, indicating on the one hand where improvements appear to have been 
made and, on the other hand, where they are perhaps still called for; 
d) Endorses fully the Court of Auditors' conclusion that "the guidelines 
drawn up in consultation with the Member States are too general in that 
they do not make it possible to define the priorities precisely"2, and 
notes that this corroborates Parliament's own view that "the current 
guidelines, which cover a wide range of different operations ••• are 
defined in very general terms and all have the same degree of priority, and 
that this runs counter to the need for selectivity and prevents the 
Community objectives established by the reform of the Fund from being 
achieved"3; 
e) Agrees, furthermore, that this lack of clarity of definition inevitably 
gives rise to confusion, on the part of all parties concerned, in the 
appraisal and, ultimately, the selection of projects as a result of 
different and sometimes conflicting interpretations of basic concepts and 
criteria (notably in respect of new technologies); 
2 OJ c 326, 16.12.85, pp. 73 and 74 (paras. 8.17 and 8.30) 
3 Resolution of 15 March 1985 embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on 
the guidelines for the management of the ESF for the years 1986- 1988, OJ C 94, 
15.4.85, p. 148 
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f) Stresses that this highly unsatisfactory state of affairs is compounded 
by the uncertainty resulting from the slowness in the decision-making 
procedure and, in particular, in the payment of advances and settlement of 
final payment claims, and is particularly concerned by the grave practical 
problems arising in this connection for small project operators which are 
usually voluntary organisations virtually totally dependent on external 
funding; 
g) Draws attention, furthermore, to the particular problem faced by 
operators whose projects <and notably training courses> do not coincide 
with the calendar year, i.e. the period covered by the Community's 
budgetary exercise; notes, in this connection, that under the present 
rules, in the case of a project covering, for instance, the period from 
September to July, two successive, and separate, applications have to be 
made to the ESF, the first for the period from September to December and 
the second for the period from January to July without, moreover, any prior 
guarantee that the necessary assistance will be forthcoming to complete the 
project; 
h) Notes, as regards payment appropriations, that the rate of utilisation 
has improved in comparison with previous years and that this can no doubt 
be ascribed, at least in part, to the acceleration in the rate of payment 
of advances as a consequence of the new operating rules obtaining in this 
connection; considers, however, that to place this apparent improvement in 
its proper perspective, the rate of 94.38 r. for 1984 should be compared not 
only with the corresponding rate for 1983 <a disastrous 66.66 %), but also 
with that for 1982 (83.17 X>; 
i) Regrets, furthermore, that an amount of 86 mECU in payment 
appropriations had to be cancelled at the end of the financial year under 
review; 
j) Finds, on the other hand, the poor rate of utilisation of commitment 
appropriations in 1984 (91.59 r., as against 96.33 r. in 1983 and 95.78 r. in 
1982) extremely disappointing and deplores in particular the Commission's 
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failure to commit any of the 36 mECU added, on second reading, to the ESF 
budget for 1984, following Parliament's decision to use part of its 
severely limited margin of manoeuvre to this end; 
k) Notes that, in the light of the information available at the time of 
drawing up this opinion, the position as regards payments honouring the 
1 850 mECU in commitments entered into in 1984 is now as follows: 900 mECU 
have been paid out in advances, over half of the final payment claims for a 
total amount of 590 mECU (duly submitted within the 31.10.85 deadline) have 
already been processed, and it is estimated that a further 25 mECu will be 
required to settle final payment claims in respect of specific measures 
<which are subject to a different timetable>; 
l) Understands, furthermore, that the discrepancy between the total amount 
paid out in advances and the total amount requested in final payments may 
largely result from over-estimation of the duration of projects and/or of 
the number of people involved in them; 
m) Takes note, however, in this connection of the Commission's remark that 
the new rules laid down to prevent a repetition of such cancellations 
should begin to take effect in 1985; 
n) Regrets that, despite far-reaching changes in the provisions regarding 
the financing of projects - in particular, the settlement of final payment 
requests - and in view of the increasingly worrying problem of the "weight 
of the past", the Commission does not deal adequately with the inevitable 
consequences of the commitments entered into in 1984; 
o) Is at a loss to understand why there was a take-up of only 50 ~, in 
terms of both commitment and payment appropriations, in respect of Article 
61 <"specific measures">, particularly as this line specifically provides a 
"golden" opportunity for implementing innovatory, pilot and/or 
demonstration projects with a potential for subsequent Community-wide 
application; 
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p> Notes, finally, with some concern, the Commission's statement that 
applications for young people in respect of vocational training operations 
leading directly to jobs in small or medium-sized enterprises to promote 
applied research in the development of new products, services or production 
processes in various sectors, and notably in the new technologies, fell 
short of expectations, and calls on it to comment on this disappointing 
state of affairs. 
Recommendations 
4. In view of the foregoing, the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment: 
a) Insists that, when it comes to draw up its report on the activities of 
the European Social Fund during the financial year 1985, the Commission 
include a separate chapter giving a clear overall assessment of the 
performance of the Fund since the entry into force of the new Rules, both 
indicating where progress has been made and, in the case of shortcomings, 
submitting specific suggestions for improvement, including, if appropriate, 
proposed amendments to the Fund's rules and guidelines; it would be 
helpful, moreover, if this indispensable evaluation were linked to the 
pluriannual forecast of Social Fund expenditure which was most regrettably 
not included in the Commission's report for 1984; 
b) Insists, furthermore, that the Commission complete and publish as a 
matter of the utmost urgency, both in the interests of all potential 
applicants for assistance from the Social Fund and for general publicity 
purposes, the long-awaited guide to the Fund and to the interpretation of 
the rules and guidelines governing its operation; and urges that this 
publication be clear, comprehensive and illustrated with practical 
examples; 
c) Urges the Commission, as part of the indispensable effort to increase 
the transparency of the role, operation and management of the Fund, to 
relaunch the promising information campaign initiated in 1984 on 
"operations of special interest" submitted under Article 3(2) relating to 
specific measures of an innovatory character within the framework of 
Community objectives; 
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rl) Calls on the Commission in its attempts to rationalise and speed up the 
processing of applications, the payment of advances and the settlement of 
final payment claims, to take special account of the specific problems 
faced by small project operators - which are frequently voluntary 
organisations largely or wholly dependent on external funding - and above 
all to fully recognise the fact that, because of shortcomings in the 
existing arrangements, such operators, while awaiting the Commission's 
decision on their applications and/or final payment claims, all too often 
have to take out loans <usually at high rates of interest) or even abandon 
their projects altogether; 
e) Asks the Commission to look into the particular problem arising in the 
case of projects - usually training projects - whose duration does not 
coincide with the Community's budgtetary exercise <i.e. the calendar year), 
and to come forward with suggestions for remedying this situation, 
including, if appropriate, specific proposals for amending the Financial 
Regulation; 
f) Notes that, in the face of the massive and ever-increasing inflow of 
applications, the Commission finds itself less and Less well equipped to 
meet the strict, albeit totally justified, demands made upon it both by the 
Court of Auditors and by the European Parliament, in terms of the 
examination of proposals and the control, examination and evaluation of the 
projects approved; suggests, therefore, that the Commission clearly 
formulate, and justify, its needs in terms of extra resources and, notably, 
staff, if it is to effect the far-reaching improvements called for in this 
connection and submit proposals to the Budgetary Authority accordingly; 
0 
0 0 
g) Requests the Committee on Budgetary Control to take due account of the 
above conclusions and recommendations in its motion for a resolution on the 
discharge fot the financial year 1984. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
REGIONAL POLICY AND REGIONAL PLANNING 
Letter from the chairman of the committee to Mr Aigner, 
chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
5 February 1986 
Dear Mr Aigner, 
At its meeting of 23/24 January 1986, the Committee on Regional Policy and 
Regional Planning examined Chapter 7, Regional Aid Expenditure, of the Court 
of Auditors' report concerning the financial year 1984 (OJ C 326 of 
16.12.85>. The committee reQuests the Committee on Budgetary Control to take 
account of the following comments in drawing up the motion for a resolution on 
the 1984 discharge. 
The committee noted that the observations of the Court on the management 
of the funds allocated to the European Regional Development Fund in 1984 
co•nplement and reaffirm the criticisms it has made in previous years: 
(i) under-use of the appropriations entered in the budget for the 
non-quota section of the ERDF; 
(ii) delays in closing files on old decisions where projects have not 
been completed within a reasonable time-scale; 
(iii) concern regarding the additionality of Community expenditure; 
(iv) criticisms of specific investments arising from on-the-spot 
inspections which have revealed inadeQuate planning before the 
decision to invest and poor monitoring of the results of the 
investment; 
(v) discrepancies between estimates of jobs to be created by an 
investment and the number of jobs which are in fact created; 
<vi) failure to take sufficient account of the requirement to ensure the 
economic viability of enterprises which are granted aid. 
The committee noted that, while problems associated with the non-quota 
section (point (i)) and the termination of old projects (point Cii)) remained 
to be resolved, there was evidence of improvement. 
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The committee fully endorses the comments of the Court on additiondlity, a 
matter which it regards as fundamental to increasing the effectiveness of the 
EROF, while recognising that the Commission is faced by theoretical and 
practical difficulties in determining whether funds are used 'additionally'. 
The committee appreciates the way in which the Court's general criticisms 
are supported by specific examples relating to decisions adopted in years 
prior to 1984 and based on audits carried o~t in Italy, France and Germany. 
With regard to the particular cases described in the report, the committee 
considers that they make clear that the Commission must undertake an 
exhaustive, critical examination of the justification of the investment given 
by the investor and Member State concerned~ as the considerations underlying 
the decision to invest may not be strictly economic but may have a political 
dimension. 
The Court's observations underline the importance of the shift from the 
financing of individual projects to the co-financing of programmes which has 
occurred following the adoption of the new ERDF Regulation. The examples 
given also reaffirm the urgent need to increase the staff assigned to the 
management of aid in the regional sector and to make the greatest possible use 
of computerization. 
The committee believes, however, that the new EROF Regulation cannot alone 
resolve the difficulties to which the Court has drawn attention; it agrees 
with the view expressed by the Court that the Commission should 'take all the 
necessary steps at the level of management and bring all its influence to bear 
on the Member States' to resolve these persistent problems. The committee 
would stress that the mis-allocation of ERDF funds reduces the effectiveness 
of the ERDF, as the funds committed to uncompleted or unproductive projects 
are thereby denied to more useful and profitable investments. 
Pancrazio DE PASQUALE 
The following took part in the vote: Mr DE PASQUALE, chairman; Mr PEREIRA, 
first vice-chairman; Mr NEWMAN, second vice-chairman; Mr ARBELOA MURU, 
Mr BEAZLEY, Mrs BOOT, Mr BRITO APOLONIA, Mr CABEZON (deputizing for 
Mr MATTINA), Mr GANGOITI LLAGUNO, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mr HUTTON, Mrs LEMASS, 
Mr LLORENS BARGES, Mr O'DONNELL, Mr OLIVIA GA~CIA~ Mr PAZ (deputizing for 
Mr _AVGERINOS), Mr POETSCHKI, Mr SAKELLARIOU and Mr STEVENSON (deputizing for 
Mr HUME). 
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(Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
Draftsman: Mr A. MICHELINI 
On 20 NovemQer 1985, the Committee on Development and ~ooperation 
appointed Mr MICHELINI draftsma~ of the opinion. 
The Committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 
26 February 1986 and 28 February ~986. It adopted the draft opinion 
unanimously on 28 February 1986. 
The following took part in the vote: Mrs FOCKE, Chairman; 
Mrs CASSAr•MAGNAGO CERRETT!, acting draftsman; Mr COHEN; Mr CONDESSO; 
Mrs DALY; Mrs DE BAL~~R-VA~ OC~EN; Mr DURAN CORSANEGO; Mr ESTRELLA 
PEDROLA; Mr FERNANDES; Mr GALLAND; Mr C. JACKSON; Mr McGOWAN; 
Mr MUNTINGH Cdeputising for Mr SABY>; Mr RUBERT DE VENTOS; Mrs SCHMIT; 
Mrs SIMONS, Mr SIMPSON; Mr WAWRZIK. 
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Opi~ion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation, 
A. ha•Jing regard to the annual report of the Court of Auditors concerning 
the ~inancial year 1984 accom~anied by the replies of the institutions (1), 
B. having regard to its previous op1n1ons on the granting of discharge, 
and in particular it~ opinion on the granting of discharge in respect 
of t~e 198: Budget ( >, 
a> Title 9 of the Budget 
1. Notes with satisfaction the marked improvement in the rate of utilis~+ion 
of both commitment appropriations (89~) a~d paymenc ~pp.~priations (78Yo) 
d~ring the 1984 financial year; 
2. Notes that the quant1t1es of food aid mobilised in 1984 increased considerably, 
thereby making good much of the backlog resulting from deLays in the 1983 
programmes; 
3. De~Lores the vnnecess2rily long delay between the initiation of procedures 
for ~obil:~ing food aid and its arrival in the port of unloading which, 
in 1984, a~ounted on average to 14 wee~s for cereals, 19 weeks for butteroil 
and 23 weeks for milk powder, thes~ figu~es showing no improvement over 
1983; believes that this situation can best be remedied by si~plifying the 
complex procedures for the mobilisation of food aid and by replacing the 
basic foorl aid regulation (regulation No. 3331/82>, which has never had the 
approval of the European Parliament, with a new regulation prov1ding for 
more acceptable and efficient decision-making procedures; 
4. Stresses, furthermore, the importance of food aid deliveries being properly 
programmes; 
5. StressP~. •he importance of ensuring the quality of products deliv~red as 
food a1d, and calls for full use to be made of the appropriations for quality 
control entered agai~st item 9271 of the budget; 
6. Regrets that, despite previous appeals by the Comm1ttee on Development and 
Cooperation, the Court of Auditors has again noted deficiencies in the 
packaging of food aid products; 
7. Insists on the Commission m~nitoring the use made of counterpart funds from 
th~ ~roceeds of the sale of food aid, and ensuring that these are utiLised 
as agreed; 
(1) OJ ::o. ~ 326 of 16.12.85 
(2) Doc. AZ-10/85/C, p. 57, draftsman ~r Vcrge~r 
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8. Considers unacceptable the low rate of utilisation of appropriations u1;aer 
Article 930 during 1984, while congratulating the Commission on the great 
improvement in this respect during 1985; 
9. Questions the advisability of minority participation in co-financed projects 
in which the Community, contributing only a small ~roportion of funds, has 
little influence on the management; 
10. Notes the important role played by consultants in preparing and implementing 
project3 ~nder budget chapter 93 and the EDF; consequently calls on the 
Commission to exercise great ca~e in the choice of consultants and, 
subsequentLy, in monitoring their work; 
11. Str~sses the importance of having more Commission repr£sentatives in Latin 
Am~r·can and As1an developing countries, particularly as certain regional 
organizations ~andated to manage Community projects have merited severe 
cr1ticism by the Court of Auditors; 
12. Condemns the failure to make payments under item 958- special programme 
to combat hunger in tbe ~orld. during 1984 beca~se of technical difficulties; 
13. Regrets once more the poor rate of ~tilis3tion ot m3ny appropriation~ under 
Chapter 96 - protocols with the Mediterranean cJy~t· 1~s; 
b) ~ur0ped~ Oeve!ooment Fund 
14. Repeats its r.1ssat13faction at the fact that the EDF is not budgetised; 
15. CaLLs on the ~ember States and the Commission to ensure tnat quarterly 
contributions to the ~DF are oaid 0r. time by all 'Member States; 
16. Emphasises t~e need for more on-going and ex-post evaluation of projects 
so that the lessons le~rned may be used when assessing orojects for 
ass1st~nce und~r the 6th EDF; in this regard emphasises the important role 
ot delegati0ns in ACP countries in the regula~ monitoring of proj!~ts; 
17. Exoresses concern that the EDF funds administered by the European Investment 
Bank 3re not subject to control by the Court of Auditors in the same ~ay 
as E~F funds admi~!st~red by the Commission; 
i8. Expresses its growing concern about delays which stitl occur ;n making 
patments to contractors under the EDF; asks the Conmi~s;on to make available 
to the Parliamer.t statistics which indicate the annual proporri~n of dela1ed 
pay~ent, the causes of delays and the measures being taken to remedy the 
situation; 
·
1
• ~·.J~rs~~ tbe Cc~rt of Auditors' observations reg~rding the importance of 
prelim1na~1 st~Jies, the role of technical assi~tance and the maintenance 
ot ccmpl~tJ~ projects; 
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20. With regard to Stabex, 
stresses the ne~d for accuratP statistics in th~ ~PnPficiary coLtntri~s, 
and in this respect notes that the programme financed by Article 948 of 
the budget could go some way towards improving the quality of statistical 
information in developing countries; 
- draws attention to the fact that in some of the cases examined by the 
Court of Auditors, shortfalls in export earnings were made good by Stabex 
by am~unts which, when added to the export earnings of the year in question, 
provided the recipient state with total earnings in excess of those for 
the reference period; 
<c) General 
21. Repeats its calls for an immediate and thorough investigation to be made of the 
staffing needsof DG VIII and of the staff required to implemen~ the programme 
of aid to Latin America ana Asian developing countr1es, the results of this 
investi~ation should be reflected in the table of effectives con~a:ned in the 
1987 bud9et; recalls its demands made in previous disch2rge reports for 
improv~d evaluation procedures; 
22. P.eaffirms the considerable importance which the Parliament has attached to the 
full implementation of the 1986 budget amendments which provided for 20 
additional staff for DG VIII and DG I for development cooperation, a~d 7 
additional staff for a ~ew evaluation unit in DG VIII, and demands an early 
report on progress with the implementation of new evaluation procedures; 
23. Reauests the Committee on Budgetary Control to take account of the above 
observations in its report on the granting of discharge in respect of the 
implementation of the 1984 budget; 
24. Believes that, subject to the above remarks, discharge should be granted in 
respect of the implementation of Title 9 of the budget of the Europear. 
Communities and of the EDF for the 1984 financial year. 
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